Asean is no European Union, and its go-slow
approach to integration works well in the region
Governments,
political-economic analysts and newspaper editorials all over the world reacted
with alarm at the June 23 British referendum result for the United Kingdom to
withdraw from the European Union.
In Asia,
the vote to exit from the most integrated regional organisation in the world
sparked comparisons with Asean, often touted as the most successful regional
organisation in Asia and the developing world. Many warned that regional
integration had gone too far in Europe. They noted that Asean should be careful
with projects like the Asean Economic Community (which might aggravate economic
inequalities) and the free movement of eight professions (which might raise
fears of job losses).
I would
suggest that most of these comparisons are misplaced. Apart from sensitising
Asean against taking any ambitious leaps forward on enhanced regional
cooperation (that is, more substantive integration), the impact on Asean will
be minimal.
First,
the EU and Asean are very different animals. The EU's founding fathers
envisioned a post-Westphalian regional order based on (French political
economist and diplomat) Jean Monnet's vision of a supranational Europe when
they formed the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. This was based on
shared political and social values; a sense of a shared "European"
identity based on history; a desire not to repeat the nationalist mistakes that
led to two world wars; alignment with the US; and opposition to communism. They
pledged to transcend the nation-state based on shared sovereign control over
sensitive resources linked to heavy industry, weapons manufacturing and atomic
energy.
Asean, on
the other hand, was founded by five states which sought to consolidate
post-colonial regimes, most of which had recently become independent. Unlike
their European counterparts, Asean states used their organisation to guarantee
and build each nation-state's sovereignty. Non-interference in the domestic
affairs of each state and weak centralised coordination (a secretariat did not
even come into existence until 1976) were sacrosanct principles.
Even the
post-Cold War decision to move towards a low-level Asean free trade area was
considered sensitive. There is no single currency, no Asean passport. The
"four freedoms" of the EU's single market - free movement of goods,
capital, services and especially persons (citizens' right to move and live in
any state within the organisation) - are simply absent or restricted in Asean.
Second,
the series of concurrent crises in Europe since 2009 has simply put the EU, as
it has been conceived, under multiple and severe strain.
The euro
crisis, the breakdown of states in the EU's neighbourhood (especially Libya,
Ukraine and Syria), the ensuing influx of refugees and the rise of ISIS and
terrorism in Europe - these ongoing crises and the difficulty of reaching
consensus among 28 member states have simply overwhelmed the capacity of
national governments and the EU institutions (Commission, Parliament, European
Central Bank) to arrive at common solutions that can placate the heightened
anxieties of European publics.
In
comparison, the Asean region has been fortunate in having populations and
economies that continue growing, with no failed states in the neighbourhood,
and it does not face the same scale of displaced persons or a tide of
immigrants seeking a better life within its members' borders.
Third,
the depth of integration demanded of member states in Asean has been low.
Asean's leaders have found the EU integration process very useful as a
reference or even a model for its own institutionalisation. But they have been
careful to avoid politically sensitive, long-term commitments from which
disentanglement could be protracted and costly.
For
instance, Asean study teams visited Brussels and Berlin in the aftermath of the
2004 "no" referendum votes in France and the Netherlands to a
European Constitution, in order to avoid making similar mistakes in the framing
of the Asean Charter .
On
transnational crises such as the haze or international ones such as the
disputes over the ownership of islands in the South China Sea, Asean has often
been criticised for not finding a regional solution or for not speaking with
one voice to external powers such as China.
But this
avoidance of locking in Asean states' positions into categorical legal
commitments has also allowed Asean a measure of flexibility in shifting gears as
fast-evolving situations demand. Asean states can and do respond to
globalisation pressures without disenfranchising whole socio-economic segments
of the population within states, or whole states from the pressures of an
"ever closer union".
If there
is one lesson of Brexit for Asean, it is that Asean should not take the
benefits of regional projects for granted.
Citizens,
the media and governments need to know and be reminded that there are tangible
benefits to belonging to a regional organisation. The benefits of projects like
the Asean Economic Community may not be immediately apparent or evenly
distributed to everyone in society (in fact, there might even be some
"losers"). But to win public support over the long term, governments,
Asean agencies and scholars need to engage in public diplomacy and debates to
educate their populations and highlight both the attendant costs and benefits
inherent in any regional initiative.
Reuben
Wong
Associate
Professor Reuben Wong is Director of Studies, College of Alice and Peter Tan,
at the National University of Singapore.
No comments:
Post a Comment