THE LAW OF HYBRID WARFARE
Building
off of the strategies that he described in last year’s book of the same name,
Andrew Korybko has conceptualized a new paradigm for understanding
international relations and invented an accompanying methodology for testing
it. The “Law Of Hybrid War”, the name of his newest series, states that:
The
grand objective behind every Hybrid War is to disrupt multipolar transnational
connective projects through externally provoked identity conflicts (ethnic,
religious, regional, political, etc.) within a targeted transit state.
Russia’s
Eurasian integration objectives and China’s Silk Road projects are the targets
of the US’ global Hybrid War strategy, and this accordingly opens up a wide
range of geographic battlefields. Andrew examines the Greater Heartland, the
Balkans, ASEAN, transoceanic Africa, and Latin America in identifying the
vulnerabilities that each of the relevant transit states has to this
revolutionary type of asymmetrical warfare.
His
unique methodology incorporates the variables of ethnicity, religion, history,
administrative boundaries, physical geography, and socio-economic disparity in
crafting comprehensive analyses that demonstrate each country’s Hybrid War
weaknesses. The objective of the work is to illustrate the means that the US
could predictably employ in destabilizing these targeted states, thereby giving
decision makers and the public advance notice so that they can be better
prepared to deal with certain preplanned scenarios as they arise.
Please
visit us to follow the updates of the “Hybrid Wars” series due to be released
every Friday starting today.
The
Law Of Hybrid Warfare
Hybrid
War is
one of the most significant strategic developments that the US has ever
spearheaded, and the transitioning of Color Revolutions to Unconventional Wars
is expected to dominate the destabilizing trends of the coming decades. Those
unaccustomed to approaching geopolitics from the Hybrid War perspective might
struggle to understand where the next ones might occur, but it’s actually not
that difficult to identify the regions and countries most at risk of falling
victim to this new form of aggression.
The key
to the forecast is in accepting that Hybrid Wars are externally
provoked asymmetrical conflicts predicated on sabotaging concrete geo-economic
interests, and proceeding from this starting point, it’s relatively easy to
pinpoint where they might strike next.
The
series begin by explaining the patterns behind Hybrid War and deepening the
reader’s comprehension of its strategic contours. Afterwards, we will prove how
the previously elaborated framework has indeed been at play during the US’ Wars
on Syria and Ukraine, its first two Hybrid War victims. Next part reviews all
of the lessons that have been learned thus far and applies them in forecasting
the next theaters of Hybrid War and the most vulnerable geopolitical triggers
within them.
Subsequent
additions to the series will thenceforth focus on those regions and convey why
they’re so strategically and socio-politically vulnerable to becoming the next
victims of the US’ post-modern warfare.
Patterning
The Hybrid War
The first
thing that one needs to know about Hybrid Wars is that they’re never unleashed
against an American ally or anywhere that the US has premier preexisting
infrastructural interests. The chaotic processes that are unleashed during the
post-modern regime change ploy are impossible to fully control and could
potentially engender the same type of geopolitical blowback against the US that
Washington is trying to directly or indirectly channel towards its multipolar
rivals.
Correspondingly,
this is why the US won’t ever attempt Hybrid War anywhere that it has interests
which are “too big to fail”, although such an assessment is of course
contemporaneously relative and could quickly change depending on the
geopolitical circumstances.
Nevertheless,
it remains a general rule of thumb that the US won’t ever intentionally
sabotage its own interests unless there’s a scorched-earth benefit in doing so
during a theater-wide retreat, in this context conceivably in Saudi Arabia if
the US is ever pushed out of the Mideast.
Geostrategic-Economic
Determinants:
Before
addressing the geo-economic underpinnings of Hybrid War, it’s important to
state out that the US also has geostrategic ones as well, such as entrapping
Russia in a predetermined quagmire.
The “Reverse Brzezinski”, as the author has taken to calling it,
is simultaneously applicable to Eastern Europe through Donbass, the Caucasus
through Nagorno-Karabakh, and Central Asia through the Fergana Valley, and if synchronized through timed
provocations, then this triad of traps could prove lethally efficient in
permanently ensnaring the Russian bear.
This
Machiavellian scheme will always remain a risk because it’s premised on an
irrefutable geopolitical reality, and the best that Moscow can do is try to
preempt the concurrent conflagration of its post-Soviet periphery, or promptly
and properly respond to American-provoked crises the moment they emerge.
The
geostrategic elements of Hybrid War are thus somewhat inexplicable from the
geo-economic ones, especially in the case of Russia, but in making the examined
pattern more broadly pertinent to other targets such as China and Iran, it’s
necessary to omit the “Reverse Brzezinski” stratagem as a prerequisite and
instead focus more on the economic motivations that the US has in each
instance.
The grand
objective behind every Hybrid War is to disrupt multipolar transnational
connective projects through externally provoked identity conflicts (ethnic,
religious, regional, political, etc.) within a targeted transit state.
This
template can clearly be seen in Syria and Ukraine and is the Law of Hybrid
Warfare. The specific tactics and political technologies utilized in each
destabilization may differ, but the strategic concept remains true to this
basic tenet. Taking this end goal into account, it’s now possible to move from
the theoretical into the practical and begin tracing the geographic routes of
various projects that the US wants to target.
To
qualify, the multipolar transnational connective projects being referred to
could be either energy-based, institutional, or economic, and the more overlap
that there is among these three categories, the more likely it is that a Hybrid
War scenario is being planned for a given country.
Socio-Political
Structural Vulnerabilities:
Once the
US has identified its target, it begins searching for the structural vulnerabilities
that it will exploit in the coming Hybrid War. Contextually, these aren’t
physical objects to be sabotaged such as power plants and roads (although they
too are noted, albeit by different destabilization teams), but socio-political
characteristics that are meant to be manipulated in order to attractively
emphasize a certain demographic’s “separateness” from the existing national
fabric and thus ‘legitimize’ their forthcoming foreign-managed revolt against
the authorities. The following are the most common socio-political structural
vulnerabilities as they relate to the preparation for Hybrid War, and if each
of them can be tied to a specific geographic location, then they become much
more likely to be used as galvanizing magnets in the run-up to the Color
Revolution and as preliminary territorial demarcations for the Unconventional
Warfare aspect afterwards:
*
ethnicity
*
religion
* history
*
administrative boundaries
*
socio-economic disparity
*
physical geography
The
greater the overlap that can be achieved among each of these factors, the
stronger the Hybrid War’s potential energy becomes, with each overlapping
variable exponentially multiplying the coming campaign’s overall viability and
‘staying power’.
Preconditioning:
Hybrid
Wars are always preceded by a period of societal and structural
preconditioning. The first type deals with the informational and soft power
aspects that maximize key demographics’ acceptance of the oncoming
destabilization and guide them into believing that some type of action (or
passive acceptance of others’ thereof) is required in order to change the
present state of affairs.
The
second type concerns the various tricks that the US resorts to in order to have
the target government unintentionally aggravate the various socio-political
differences that have already been identified, with the goal of creating
cleavages of identity resentment that are then more susceptible to societal
preconditioning and subsequent NGO-directed political organizing (linked in
most cases to the Soros Foundation and/or National Endowment for Democracy).
To expand
on the tactics of structural preconditioning, the most commonly employed and
globally recognized one is sanctions, the implicit goal of which (although not
always successful) has always been to “make life more difficult” for the
average citizen so that he or she becomes more amenable to the idea of regime
change and is thus more easily shepherded into acting upon these externally
instilled impulses.
Less
known, however, are the more oblique, yet presently and almost ubiquitously
implemented, methods of achieving this goal, and this surrounds the power that
the US has to affect certain budgetary functions of targeted states, namely the
amount of revenue that they receive and what precisely they spend it on.
The
global slump in energy and overall commodity prices has hit exporting states
extraordinarily hard, many of which are disproportionately dependent on such
selling such resources in order to satisfy their fiscal ends, and the decrease
in revenue almost always leads to eventual cuts in social spending.
Parallel
with this, some states are facing American-manufactured security threats that
they’re forced to urgently respond to, thus necessitating them to unexpectedly
budget more money to their defense programs that could have otherwise been
invested in social ones.
On their
own, each of these ‘tracks’ is designed to decrease the government’s social
expenditure so as to incubate the medium-term conditions necessary for
enhancing the prospects of a Color Revolution, the first stage of Hybrid
Warfare. In the event that a state experiences both limited revenue intake and
an unexpected need to hike its defense budget, then this would have a compound
effect on cutting social services and might even push the Color Revolution
timeframe forward from the medium- to short-term, depending on the severity of
the resultant domestic crisis and the success that the American-influenced NGOs
have in politically organizing the previously examined identity blocs against
the government.
HYBRID WARS 2: TESTING THE THEORY, SYRIA AND
UKRAINE
This part
of the research thus follows the theoretical model that was just set out before
it, in that it elaborates on the geostrategic-economic determinants that were
behind the Wars on Syria and Ukraine, before touching on the socio-political
structural vulnerabilities that the US attempted to exploit to various degrees
of success. The last part incorporates the idea of social and structural
preconditioning and briefly discusses how it was present in each case.
Geostrategic
Determinants
Syria:
The
traditionally secular Arab Republic was sucked into the US’ theater-wide Color
Revolution scheme when the “Arab Spring” was unleashed in 2011.
To
concisely summarize the strategic underpinnings of this grandiose operation,
the concept was for the US to assist a transnational Muslim Brotherhood clique
in coming to power from Algeria to Syria via a series of synchronized regime
change operations against rival states (Syria), untrustworthy partners (Libya),
and strategic proxy states set for inevitable leadership transitions (Egypt,
Yemen).
The
resultant strategic environment was supposed to resemble Cold War-era Eastern
Europe, in that each of the states would have been led by the same party (the
Muslim Brotherhood instead of the Communist Party) and controlled by proxy via
an external patron, in this case a joint condominium presided over by Turkey
and Qatar on the US’ Lead From Behind behalf.
This
loosely organized ideological ‘confederation’ would have been disjointed enough
to be manageable via simple divide-and-rule tactics (thus preventing it from
ever independently organizing against Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States), but
easily provoked into sectarian hatred for mobilizing against Iran and its
regional interests, thereby making it an extremely flexible tool for promoting
American grand strategy in the Mideast.
Given the
chaotic origins of this geopolitical gambit, it was predetermined that elements
of it wouldn’t go according to plan and that only the partial realization of
this project could realistically occur during the first attempt, which is
precisely what happened when the Syrian people defiantly withstood the Hybrid
War assault against them and courageously fought in defense of their secular
civilization-state.
It can be
argued that Syria was always seen as the most strategic prize out of all the
“Arab Spring”-affected states, and this is proven by the desperate nearly
five-year-long Hybrid War that the US unleashed against it in response to its
initial regime change attempt failing there. In comparison, Egypt, the most
populous Arab state, has only had to deal with low-level Qatari-managed terrorism in the Sinai ever
since it overthrew the American-imposed Muslim Brotherhood government.
The
reason for this glaring discrepancy of relative importance to American grand
strategic goals is attributable to the geo-economic determinants behind the War
on Syria, which will be expostulated upon shortly.
Ukraine:
The
geostrategic determinants behind the War on Ukraine are much more
straightforward than those behind the War on Syria, and they’ve mostly already
been spoken about earlier when describing the “Reverse Brzezinski” stratagem of
geopolitical entrapment.
Part of
the motivation behind overthrowing the Ukrainian government and ushering in the
subsequent anti-Russian pogroms was to lure Russia into an interventionist trap
à la 1979 Afghanistan, and the War on Donbass was the epitome of this attempt.
Washington failed to achieve its objective in this regard, but it was much more
successful in turning the entire territory of Ukraine into a geopolitical
weapon against Russia.
Brzezinski
famously quipped that “Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire”,
and while he had a whole different conception in mind when he said that (his
thinking was that Russia would try to “imperially re-Sovietize” the region),
geopolitically speaking, his quote holds a lot of fundamental truth to it.
The
Russian Federation’s national security is to a large extent determined by
events in Ukraine, especially as it relates to its broad western periphery, and
a hostile government in Kiev that becomes amenable to hosting US “missile
defense” infrastructure (which is really a euphemism for increasing the chances
that the US can neutralize Russia’s second-strike capability and thus put it in
a position of nuclear blackmail) would pose a major strategic threat.
To
rephrase Brzezinski and make his quote more objectively accurate, “If the West
succeeds in manipulating Ukraine into becoming a long-term enemy of Russia,
then Moscow would be faced with a major geopolitical obstacle to its future
multipolar ambitions.”
The dire
scenario of Ukraine hosting US or NATO “missile defense” units has yet to play
out in full, but the country is still making leaps towards “Shadow NATO” membership whereby it becomes a de-facto part
of the organization without the formal mutual defense guarantees.
The
increased military cooperation between Kiev and Washington, and by extension,
between Ukraine and the bloc, is premised on aggressive maneuvering against
Russian strategic interests. Nevertheless, this isn’t as bad as it could have
been, since American strategic planners had naively assumed that the Pentagon
would have already had control of Crimea by this time, and therefore would have
been able to position their “missile defense” units and other destabilizing
technologies right on Russia’s doorstep.
The
ultimate fallacy in the West’s thinking during the Hybrid War preparations was
that Russia would back down from defending its civilizational, humanitarian,
and geostrategic interests in Crimea (or that if it did so, it would be pulled
into a “Reverse Brzezinski” quagmire), which as history now attests, was an
epic miscalculation on par with the worst the US has ever made.
Geo-Economic
Determinants
Syria:
Syria is
so significant from the perspective of American grand strategy because it was
supposed to be the end terminal for the Friendship Pipeline shared between it, Iran, and Iraq.
This gas route would have allowed Iran to access the European market and
completely nullify the sanctions regime that the US had built against it at
that time.
Contemporaneous
with this project was a competing one by Qatar to send its own gas through
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and thenceforth to the EU, either through LNG or
via Turkey. President Assad astutely rejected the Gulf proposal out of loyalty
to his country’s long-established Iranian ally, and the War and Syria as waged
through the post-“Arab Spring” Hybrid War against it was supported so fiercely
by the US and the Gulf States specifically to punish the country for its
refusal to become a unipolar satellite.
If it
would have been completed, the Friendship Pipeline would have been one of the
world’s most important multipolar transnational connective projects, in that it
would have revolutionized regional geopolitics by providing an energy and
investment corridor linking Iran with the EU.
It would
have thus entailed a significant alteration in the Mideast’s balance of power
and played to the absolute detriment of the US and its Gulf allies.
Understanding
the acute threat that the Friendship Pipeline posed its decades-long hegemonic
dominance over the region, the US committed itself to making sure that the
project would never materialize no matter what, ergo one of the partial reasons
behind the creation of ISIL smack dab in the middle of the
expected transit zone.
Seen from
this perspective, it’s much clearer why the US would prioritize the
destabilization of Syria over that of Egypt, and would actually be willing to
pour innumerable resources into this endeavor and organize a global proxy
coalition to help achieve it.
Ukraine:
The US’
determination in capturing Ukraine was inspired by much more than just
geostrategic thinking, since those imperatives intersected with contemporaneous
geo-economic realities.
At the
time that the urban terrorist campaign popularly known as “EuroMaidan” was
initiated, Ukraine was forced by the US into an artificial “civilizational
choice” between the EU and Russia. Moscow had been advancing three interlinked
multipolar transnational connective projects – gas and oil sales to the EU, the
Eurasian Union, and the Eurasian Land Bridge (energy, institutional, and
economic, respectively) – that Washington was eager to weaken at all costs.
Recalling
Brzezinski’s earlier cited quip about Ukraine and the author’s rephrasing of
it, the words now make a lot more sense, as without Ukraine as a part of this
interconnected web of projects, the entire whole becomes substantially weaker
than if it were otherwise.
As it
relates to each of the projects, Ukraine’s removal from the equation: obstructs
the Russian-EU energy trade and creates unexpected complications for both
sides; leaves a sizeable marketplace and labor force outside the scope of the
customs union; and necessitates an infrastructural refocusing solely on
relatively smaller and less economically important Belarus, which thus becomes
a geopolitical chokepoint that figures even greater than before into the West’s
anti-Russian schemes.
As an
added ‘benefit’ of poaching Ukraine from the Russian integrational orbit, the
US was able to set into motion a chain of thematically preconceived events
(excluding Crimea’s reunification, of course) that instigated the New Cold War
it was eager to spark.
It wanted
to do so in order to create seemingly insurmountable obstacles between Russia
and the EU, knowing that the expected security dilemmas (in military, energy,
economic, and strategic terms) would dramatically impede cooperation between
them and make Brussels all the more vulnerable to being cajoled into the US’
massive unipolar power plays that it was planning.
In order
to maintain its hegemonic position over Europe, the US had to engineer a
scenario that would split Russia and the EU long enough and in as intense of a
manner as possible so as increase the chances that the three following
categorical projects of control could be imposed on Europe: NATO’s permanent
on-alert deployment in the east (military); US LNG exports to the EU and the
newly attractive appeal of non-Russian energy routes such as the Southern Gas Corridor (energy); and the Trans-Atlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which, among other privileges it
grants the US, makes it impossible for the EU to conduct any further Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs) without Washington’s approval (economic).
Altogether,
these three interlocked factors are intended to bolster the grandest of the US’
strategic objectives, which in a mutually interrelated manner, also increases
the prospects for their own success.
This is
the artificially engineered “clash of civilizations” between the West and
Eurasia-Russia, whereby the US expects the EU to henceforth cobble in fear
before Russia and consequently rush into Uncle Sam’s arms as the ‘defender of
Western civilization’.
It is
this ultimate plan that the US wants to fulfill in Europe, since its successful
implementation alongside its three key components (the military, energy, and
economic facets earlier described) would create the conditions for
multi-generational hegemonic dominance over Europe, and thus spiking the odds
that multipolarity’s counter-offense against the US will be a drawn-out, decades-long
affair.
Socio-Political
Structural Vulnerabilities – Syria
Ethnicity:
At least
90% of Syria’s population is Arab while the remaining 10% or so is mostly
Kurdish. From the Hybrid War perspective, one would assume that this state of
affairs might be useful in destabilizing the state, but several factors
prevented it from reaching its American-anticipated potential.
Firstly,
the Syrian population is very patriotic due to their civilizational heritage
and galvanized opposition to Israel. As a result, while there’s obviously a
plurality of personal political opinion among the mostly mono-ethnic society,
there was never any real possibility that they would violently turn against the
state, hence the need to import such a vast number of international terrorists
and mercenaries to the battlefield to satisfy this Hybrid War ‘requirement’.
Concerning
the Kurds, they’ve never had a history of anti-government rebellion unlike
their Turkish and Iraqi counterparts, thus implying that their state of affairs
in Syria was manageable and nowhere near as bad as Western information outlets
try to retroactively paint it as.
Even if
they could have been conjured up into a radical anti-government mass, their
relatively minor role in national affairs and obscure geographic distance from
any relevant power centers would have precluded them from becoming a
significant Hybrid War asset, although they’d be an effective strategic
supplement to any Arab terrorists based closer to the primary population
centers.
As is
known, however, the Kurds have remained loyal to Damascus and have not broken
with the government, thus adding confirmation to the thesis that they were
content with their original status and not prone to “rebel”.
In sum,
the ethnic components of the US’ Hybrid War planning against Syria failed to
live up to their anticipated potential, indicating that pre-war intelligence
assessments were cripplingly distorted in underestimating the unifying pull of
Syrian Patriotism.
Religion:
Syria’s
population is overwhelmingly Sunni but also has an important Alawite minority
that has traditionally held various leadership positions in the government and
military.
This
never was an issue before, but externally managed social preconditioning (in
this instance, organized by the Gulf States) acclimatized parts of the
population to sectarian thinking and began laying the psychological foundation
for takfiri tension to take root among some domestic elements after the Color
Revolution stage was initiated in early 2011.
Afterwards,
even though sectarianism was never a factor in Syrian society before and still
isn’t a major force to this day (despite almost five years of “religiously”
motivated terrorist provocations), it would be used as a rallying cry for
replenishing the ranks of foreign jihadists and as a ‘plausible’ cover for the
US and its allies to allege that President Assad doesn’t ‘represent the people’
and must therefore be overthrown.
History:
Syrian
history is thousands of years old and represents one of the richest
civilizations of all time. Consequently, this imbues the country’s citizens
with an unshakeable sense of patriotism that would later reveal itself to be
one of the strongest defenses against Hybrid War (civilizational solidarity).
It’s
obvious that this would have been discovered by American strategists in their
preparatory research on Syria, but they likely underrated its importance,
figuring that they could successfully provoke a return to the destabilizing
coup-after-coup post-independence years prior to the late Hafez Assad’s
Presidency.
On the
contrary, the vast majority of Syrians had grown to sincerely appreciate the
contributions of the Assad family to their country’s stability and success, and
they never wanted to do anything that could return the country to the dark
years that preceded the first family’s political rise.
Administrative:
The brief
legacy of separate administrative boundaries during a period of
the French occupation provided the geopolitical precedent for the US to
resurrect a formal or federalized division of Syria.
Even
though the historical memory of this time is largely lost on the psyche of
contemporary Syrians (save for the mandate-era flag that represents the
anti-government terrorists), that doesn’t mean that there’s no possibility of
externally enforcing it on them in the future and “historically justifying” it
after the fact.
The
Russian anti-terrorist intervention in Syria neutralized the possibility of the
country’s formal fragmentation, but the ongoing Race for Raqqameans that the force which captures the
terrorists’ ‘capital’ will hold the best cards in determining the post-war
internal makeup of the state, opening the possibility for the US and its
proxies to force a federalized ‘solution’ on Syria that could create largely
autonomous zones of pro-American support.
Socio-Economic
Disparity:
Pre-war
Syria had a relatively balanced distribution of socio-economic indicators,
despite adhering to the globally stereotypical ‘rule’ of the urban areas being
more developed than the rural ones.
Though
the rural areas comprise most of the country’s geographic area, only a fraction
of the population inhabited them, with most Syrians living along the
western-based north-south corridor of Aleppo-Hama-Homs-Damascus, while a
strategically important population also inhabits coastal Latakia. Up until
2011, Syria had been showing years of steady economic growth, and there’s no
reason to believe that this would have abated had it not been for the Hybrid War
against it.
Therefore,
although socio-economic disparities surely existed in Syria before the war,
they were properly managed by the government (owing in part to the
semi-socialist nature of the state) and weren’t a factor that the US could
exploit.
Physical
Geography:
This is
the one characteristic that works out most to the advantage of Hybrid War
against Syria. The Color Revolution component was concentrated in the heavily
populated western-based north-south corridor that was written about above, while
the Unconventional Warfare part thrived in the rural regions outside this area.
The
authorities understandably had difficulty balancing between urban and rural
security needs, and the absurd amount of support that the US and its Gulf
allies were channeling to the terrorists via Turkey temporarily threw the
military off balance and resulted in the stalemate that marked the first few
years of the conflict (with some dramatic back-and-forth changes from time to
time).
As this
was happening and the Syrian Arab Army was focused on the pressing security
matters challenging it along the population corridor, ISIL was able to make
swift conventional military advances along the logistically accommodating
plains and deserts of the east and rapidly set up its “caliphate’, the
consequences of which are driving the present-day course of events in the
country.
Socio-Political
Structural Vulnerabilities – Ukraine
Ethnicity:
Ukraine’s
demographic divide between East and West, Russians and Ukrainians, is well
known and has been heavily discussed. In the context of Hybrid War, this almost
clean-cut geographic distribution (with the exception of the Russian plurality
in Odessa and majority in Crimea) was a godsend to American strategic planners,
since it created an ingrained demographic dichotomy that could easily be
exploited when the time was ripe.
Religion:
Here too
is an almost perfect geographic divide between East and West, with the Russian
Orthodox and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches representing the two critical population
groups in the country.
Further
west are the Uniate and Catholic Churches, corresponding mostly to the former
lands of the interwar Second Polish Republic.
Christian
sectarianism wasn’t the most visible rallying cry behind EuroMaidan, but its radical
adherents used the coup’s success as cover for destroying Russian Orthodox
Churches and other religious property in a nationwide campaign that sought to
prompt the ethnic and cultural cleansing of the Russian
population.
History:
The
modern Ukrainian state is an artificial amalgam of territories bequeathed to it
by successive Russian and Soviet leaders. Its inherently unnatural origins curse
it with a perpetually questionable existence, and the territorial
aggrandizement after World War II complicated this even further.
The most
nationalist chunk of modern-day Ukraine used to be part of interwar Poland, and
before that, the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, thus giving its inhabitants a
diametrically different historical memory than those in the central or eastern
portions of the state.
The
Hungarian and Romanian minority communities that live in the newly added areas
(acquired from Czechoslovakia and Romania, respectively) also have a natural
degree of identity “separateness” from the state that only needed an externally
‘nudged’ destabilization to bring it fully to the surface.
As was
argued in Hybrid War and confirmed by Newsweek’s reporting just days before the
coup (suspiciously deleted from their website but referenceable on web.archive.org), the historic
ethno-religiously separate region of Western Ukraine was in full-scale armed
rebellion against the President Yanukovich, and it’s no coincidence that the
Unconventional Warfare aspect of that regime change campaign began in this
specific part of the country.
Administrative
Borders:
Ukraine’s
domestic divisions coincide quite neatly with its administrative borders on
many occasions – be they the ethnic divide, Christian sectarianism, historic
regions, or electoral results – and this served as the ultimate asymmetrical
multiplier that convinced American strategists that Hybrid War could easily be
rolled out in Ukraine.
Had it
not been for the unexpected coup in late February 2014, it’s very possible that
the US would have sought to exploit the unprecedented overlap of
socio-political vulnerabilities in Ukraine in order to physically separate the
western part of the country from the pro-government remainder of the rump
state, but only in the event that Yanukovich would have been able to
indefinitely hold out against the regime change terrorists and consolidate his
holdings in the rest of the non-“rebel”-controlled areas of the country.
Socio-Economic
Disparity:
Ukraine
is similar to Syria in the sense that it also had a near-even distribution of
socio-economic indicators, however, unlike the Arab Republic and its modest
wealth, the Eastern European state equally spread poverty among its citizens.
The large
amount of Ukrainians in poverty or very close to it created an enormous
recruiting pool for anti-government ‘activists’ to be culled by the NGO
masterminds of the EuroMaidan Color Revolution, and the absence of any
civilizational or national patriotism (excluding the hardcore fascist
perversion epitomized by Pravy Sektor and company) meant that there were no
societal safeguards in preventing the emergence of multiple “rent-a-riots” from
being organized beforehand and deployed when the time was ‘right’.
Physical
Geography:
The only
unique part of pre-war Ukraine’s mostly standardized plains geography was
Crimea, which functioned more like an island than the peninsula that it
technically is.
This
ironically worked out to the US’ severe disadvantage when the autonomous
republic’s favorable geography helped its inhabitants defend themselves long
enough to vote to secede from the failing Ukrainian state and correct
Khrushchev’s historical wrong by finally reuniting with their brethren in
Russia.
The same
geographic facilitating factors weren’t in play with Donbass, which thus
inhibited the patriots’ defense of their territory and made them much more
vulnerable to Kiev’s multiple offensives against them. In the pre-coup
environment, Ukraine’s easily traversable geography would have been ideal for
the enabling the western “revolutionaries” to make a swift, ISIL-like lunge at
Kiev once they accumulated enough stolen weaponry, equipment, and vehicles from
the numerous police stations and military barracks that they were seizing at the time.
Preconditioning
It’s
beyond the scope of the present research to discuss the social preconditioning
aspects of Hybrid War in detail, but they can generally be assumed to comprise
the social/mass media-education-NGO triad.
The
specifics about structural preconditioning are a bit different, as aside from
sanctions pressure, the other majorly discussed element described in Part I
(i.e. the energy market disruption) didn’t occur until last year and thus
wasn’t a factor in the run-up to either of the two examined Hybrid Wars.
Still,
other more distinct elements were certainly in play for each of the two states,
with Ukraine’s coffers being bled dry by endemic and parasitic corruption and
Syria having to perennially balance its military needs in defending against
Israel with its social commitment to the population (a tightrope act that it
managed quite well over the decades).
PREDICTING THE NEXT HYBRID WARS
Theoretical
Review
Identifying
The Targets:
The first
two parts of the series introduced new concepts to the Hybrid War theory and
successfully tested them on the Syrian and Ukrainian cases. This proved that a
certain methodology does in fact exist for explaining and analyzing Hybrid
Wars, and excitingly, this rubric can proactively be applied in attempting to
predict the places where this form of post-modern warfare could be directed
next. To refer to Part I, one must first recall the Law of Hybrid Warfare:
The grand
objective behind every Hybrid War is to disrupt multipolar transnational
connective projects through externally provoked identity conflicts (ethnic,
religious, regional, political, etc.) within a targeted transit state.
Considering
this, the next step is to identify the major multipolar transnational
connective projects ongoing or planned all across the world. Once this has been
done, each transit state is assessed for the greatest number of vulnerable
socio-political overlaps as according to the following six factors:
*
ethnicity
*
religion
* history
*
administrative boundaries
*
socio-economic disparity
*
physical geography
From
there, all that’s left to do is pinpoint the most socio-politically vulnerable
transit states and set out to reverse engineer the conditions necessary for
emphasizing key demographics’ anti-government “separateness” from the central
authorities. Cultural anthropologists, historians, NGO activists, media and
marketing experts, and “independent researchers”, among others, play a vanguard
role in this social preconditioning process and can also be of integral use to
US intelligence in explaining the most efficient methods to be employed in
ideologically penetrating their targeted audiences’ psyches.
Concurrent
with this, varying degrees of structural preconditioning are also practiced in
order to intensify the artificially constructed divide between the state and
the strategic elements of its citizenry.
Civilizational
And Civic Patriotism:
Hybrid
War is essentially the weaponization of chaos theory, which itself is disproportionately dependent
on the initial conditions prior to the destabilization’s onset. As has been
discussed, the socio-political vulnerabilities in each target state are
important indicators in gauging the potential success of the oncoming regime
change operation, but the six main factors are difficult to modify (let alone
in a short timeframe) if they don’t play to the full advantage of the
aggressor.
Due to
this, social and structural preconditioning take on an enhanced role, as ideas
and economic trends are a lot easier to interfere with and change than ethnic
composition and provincial boundaries, for example. Both of these constituent
characteristics (affected respectively by social and structural
preconditioning) can strongly impact on the target citizenry’s civilizational
and/or civic patriotism, which is the strongest defense that a state has in
repelling Hybrid War.
It’s at
this point where it’s worthy to once more recall the cases of Syria and
Ukraine, as each of them proceeded along a completely divergent trajectory
owing in large part to their differing level of civilizational/civic patriotism
prior to the Hybrid War against them. This initial condition is undoubtedly the
most critical in determining whether the destabilization will drag on for years
or if it’ll be a swift and easy success.
The
Syrian people have one of the world’s most vehement civilizational patriotisms,
and this in turn amplified their country’s resiliency to resisting the
multidimensional Hybrid War aggression being waged against them. As a result,
the US and its allies have had to provide continual support to their proxy
elements in order to unnaturally maintain the chaotic processes that they had
expected to become self-perpetuating. In the event that such assistance is
disrupted, it would thus directly translate into a visible weakening of the
Hybrid War elements inside the country and consequently lead to their quick
eradication.
Contrarily,
the situation was the diametric opposite in Ukraine, where no civilizational
patriotism was present (despite the rich legacy of Kievan Rus) and scarcely any
civic patriotism existed.
All that
the US had to do was efficiently organize the proper assets and give them the
signal to initiate their destabilization in unison. The chaotic processes then
proceeded as theorized and began to take on a life of their own, requiring
minimal guidance from that point onwards when compared to the strategic
quagmire that the US crept into with Syria.
The only
significant intervention that the US engaged in was the false-flag sniper attack at the end of February, and
it only did so because it sensed an irresistible opportunity to maximize the
chaos and quickly topple the government.
To
summarize this sub-section, the two glaringly different examples of Hybrid War
in Syria and Ukraine prove that the initial condition of civilizational and/or
civic patriotism is the deciding factor in influencing the course of the
asymmetrical conflict, and accordingly, should demonstrate to democratic security specialists the existential
importance in proactively supporting such measures within their own targeted
states.
Unleashing
The Wrath:
Finally,
it’s relevant to touch upon the beginning stages of Hybrid War and briefly
explain the tactical limitations of the theory as they apply to two specific categories
of states.
Concerning
the initial stage similarities shared by the vast majority of states, a
preconceived moment (typically something symbolic such as an historically
important commemoration, a parliamentary/presidential vote, or a provoked instance
of state-on-“protester” violence) or a fortuitous turn of events (e.g.
Yanukovich’s last-minute decision to postpone the EU Association Agreement) is
used as a signal to merge the separate cells comprising the regime change
social infrastructure into a critical anti-government mass that inaugurates the
Color Revolution movement and heralds the first step of Hybrid War.
Should
the ‘soft coup’ (often interspersed with lethal urban terrorism) fail, then the
‘hard coup’ push of Unconventional War is eventually initiated against the
beleaguered government and its patriotic citizenry, thereby fulfilling the
Hybrid War template.
Not all
Unconventional Wars begin with Color Revolutions and not all Color Revolutions
end in Unconventional Wars, but the US’ strategic aim going forward is to have
the two forms of regime change seamlessly merge together into an escalatory
ladder of intensified anti-government pressure whenever possible.
Some
societies with fully developed civil societies (relative to the globally
recognized Western ‘standard’) and without many of the prerequisite
socio-political vulnerabilities such as Denmark might never experience the
Unconventional Warfare aspect of Hybrid War and would only likely fall victim
to its Color Revolution side. However, a re-engineering of their demographics
(e.g. the “refugee” crisis) could predictably change that and make them much
more susceptible to a full Hybrid War.
Continuing
along, states that don’t have as robust of a civil society (or none at all in
the Western traditional sense), yet overly satisfy the socio-political
credentials for Unconventional Warfare like the Central African Republic does,
might just outright skip the Color Revolution stage and jump right into the
identity warfare part of Hybrid War. As with the first example, this could also
change via a demographic re-engineering of society, albeit in a different
manner whereby rapid (most likely Chinese-supported) development leads to the
birth of an emergent middle class that could potentially fill the ranks of
Color Revolution insurgents.
In rare
situations, there’s also the possibility of a “Reverse Hybrid War”, whereby an
Unconventional War precedes a Color Revolution. To an extent, it can be argued
that Myanmar’s drawn-out civil war created fertile conditions for the 1989
Color Revolution and subsequent rise of Aung San Suu Kyi.
While it
took over two decades for her to finally win full power, she eventually did
nonetheless, and it’s clear that the Unconventional War environment preconditioned
the masses into accepting this with time. Likewise, something similar is
currently playing out in West Africa with Boko Haram.
Each of
the four states in the Lake Chad region are coming under sharp pressure from
the terrorist group, and the violence that has resulted is creating a situation
where even a disorganized Color Revolution increases the chance of its ultimate
success precisely because of the target government’s preoccupation with Boko
Haram.
This is
especially the case with Chad, whose capital of Ndjamena is in extremely close
proximity to the battleground and has already fallen victim to a few suicide
bombings.
A nascent
Color Revolution would be the ultimate force multiplier in skyrocketing the
chances that the government would be overthrown, either by Boko Haram, the
urban insurgents, or a tacit and coordinated effort between the two. From a
standardized theoretical standpoint, the existing Unconventional Warfighters
team up with the newly active Color Revolutionaries in order to decisively
shift the balance against the state and succeed in the shared regime change
objective.
The only
alternative to this scenario would be for the military to crush the crush the
“protesters” with extreme prejudice the moment they rise up before moving on to
swiftly annihilate any terrorists that try to exploit the coming fray, with the
same pattern holding true for Chad as it does for any other state that finds
itself at risk of “Reverse Hybrid War”.
Practical Application
Taking
everything that’s been reviewed so far and proven by the Syrian and Ukrainian
test cases, it’s now time to practically apply the lessons of Hybrid War in
predicting where it could strike next.
The most
impactful multipolar transnational connective projects are spearheaded by Russia
and China, and the two most significant of them are the Eurasian Union and the
One Belt One Road (“New Silk Road”).
Their
shared area of intersection in Central Asia means that that any large-scale
destabilization in this region could accomplish the ‘two-for-one’ goal of
offsetting both Great Powers’ ambitions in one geopolitical masterstroke, which
is why there’s such a high risk of Hybrid War breaking out there sometime in
the near future.
Elsewhere,
however, there’s no direct integrational overlap of the Russian-Chinese
Strategic Partnership except in the Balkans, but even there, the confluence of
interests is less tightly connected and developed than it is in Central Asia.
It should
go without saying, however, that this makes the theater the second-most likely
region to fall victim to Hybrid Wars in the future out of American ‘necessity’
to preempt the conclusion of the two megaprojects of Balkan (“Turkish”) Stream
and the Balkan Silk Road that could decisively tilt Europe’s strategic balance
towards the multipolar world.
The other
regions at risk of Hybrid War are targeted specifically because of their
cooperation with China’s New Silk Road, and they include” the Greater Heartland
states of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; the western part of ASEAN; the
Indian Ocean archipelago state of Maldives; a large swath of trans-equatorial
Africa that bridges the oceanic divide; and Brazil-Peru and Nicaragua in Latin
America.
The below
is a map that clearly illustrates the aforementioned geographic zones most
likely to be threatened by Hybrid War in the future:
Out of
these identified regions (and with the exception of the ‘stand-alone’ state of
the Maldives), there are core countries whose identity-based destabilization is
most likely to occur due to certain context-specific reasons.
Most
realistically in terms of their relative probability, they are as follows:
Uzbekistan in the Greater Heartland; the Republic of Macedonia in the Balkans;
Myanmar in ASEAN; Djibouti-Ethiopia in Africa; and Nicaragua in Latin America.
Simplifying the earlier map, here’s what it looks like with only the
geopolitical triggers highlighted:
The above
map does come with a caveat, however, and it’s that the core triggers in the
Greater Heartland, ASEAN, Africa, and Latin America could possibly be usurped
by less likely but regionally more impactful Hybrid Wars in in the countries of
Turkmenistan, Thailand, Kenya-Tanzania, and Brazil. Destabilizations in these
countries might even be more effective in disrupting the multipolar
transnational connective projects that they’re a part of than if they happened
in their aforementioned regional counterparts. Here’s a modified map that
reflects the caveats:
Having
revealed the core targets of Hybrid War, the forthcoming sections of the
research will focus on each designated region, with an emphasis on the
highlighted triggers that are expected to either set off a wider conflagration
or irreversibly sabotage the transnational integrational projects that they’re
a part of.
The only
exception to the outlined format is the Maldives, since the author has already
written an exhaustive three-part analysis about its Hybrid War risk and the
broader geopolitical implications of its destabilization. On that account, the
next parts of the research will proceed along the order of Central Asia, the
Balkans, ASEAN, Africa, and Latin America.
Each
section will begin by describing the region’s geo-economic importance, or in
other words, how it adheres to the Law of Hybrid War. Afterwards, a brief
overview will be given whereby some of the most relevant socio-political
vulnerabilities for each state will be touched upon and incorporated into broad
Hybrid War scenarios.
Finally,
the last part specifically focuses on the core target in each region by
explaining how a Hybrid War there would quickly shatter the multipolar
transnational connective project that they’re a part of, and when appropriate,
it discusses the comparative differences in probability and impact between the
core and caveat states.
HYBRID WARS: BREAKING THE BALKANS. NATO’S
SOUTHERN EXPANSIONISM
The
Croatian-Serbian Missile Race
Historical
Foundation:
The
rivalry between Croatia and Serbia is centuries-long, stretching to before
either of them were modern-day nation states and back to the time when they
were still under the occupation of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire,
respectively.
It’s been
argued that both people are of the same ethnic origin, with their only
substantial differences being in dialect and adherence to a particular
Christian sect (Catholicism for Croats, Orthodoxy for Serbs).
Extended
research has already been published on the fraternal similarities between these
two people and the reasons for their contemporary perception of “separateness”
as regards the other, so the present study will refrain from repeating what has
already been established long before it and begin the historical discourse from
the more relevant period of World War II.
Leading
up to the intercommunal hostilities that formally broke out after the Nazi
invasion (although incidents of violence were indeed present right before
then), the Croats had been agitating for an autonomous ethno-centric sub-state
within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and they finally received their wish with the
August 1939 Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement that established the Croatian Banovina.
The
Ustase, a hyper-fascist Croatian organization led by Ante Pavelic, had been
pushing for this for quite some time, seeing it as a stepping stone to outright
independence and the fulfillment of their nationalist ambitions to forge
Greater Croatia.
Observed
from abroad, the Croatian fascists obviously seemed like ideal and natural
partners for the Nazis to cooperate with before and after their forthcoming
invasion of Yugoslavia, and it’s no surprise that Hitler would later work
hand-in-glove with Pavelic in exterminating the Serbs.
Their
pre-war collaboration was so deep that the “Independent State of Croatia”, the
Nazi-controlled puppet project during World War II (the most radical
manifestation of Greater Croatia), would be declared right after Hitler’s
invasion and over a week prior to the formal capitulation of the Yugoslav
government, suggesting that its supporters were eagerly awaiting the offensive
and understood that it was only with Nazi support that their nationalist
nightmare could become a reality.
The
pertinence that all of this has to the present era is that the Hitler-Pavelic
project for Greater Croatia incorporated the entirety of Bosnia and created a
precedent (however ethically disturbing and brief) of ‘leadership’ in the
Western Balkans that imprinted a very specific form of geo-nationalism on the
historical memory of most Croats.
While
thankfully never carried out to the ultra-extreme form of its fascist
predecessors, this brand of radical Croatian nationalism would return as a
factor during the destructive dissolution of Yugoslavia.
The
Croatian military wanted not only to purge ethnic Serbs from the Republic of
Serbian Krajina that they had established in part of the former Socialist
Republic of Croatia (itself the post-war formalization of most of the Croatian
Banovina), but they wanted to take it even further and cleanse their rival
demographic from most of Bosnia as well (although this latter objective
thankfully failed).
Indicative
of just how intimately intertwined the genocide against Serbs has become in the
modern-day Croatian national identity, 5 August, the date that the Republic of
Serbian Krajina was destroyed, is annually celebrated as the “Day of Victory
and Thanksgiving and the Day of Croatian Defenders”.
The
takeaway from this broad overview is that the Croatian political-military
establishment is vehemently anti-Serbian and that the geo-nationalist
historical memory still lingering from World War II can be easily manipulated
to gin the population up for supporting another crusade.
The focal
point in any forthcoming conflict for carving out a Greater Croatia (whether in
fact or in form) is undoubtedly Bosnia, and the provocations that Sarajevo has
lately launched against Republika Srpska bode quite negatively for the entity’s
future stability.
More than
likely, the Croatian deep state (the permanent military, diplomatic, and
intelligence apparatuses) is interested in unbalancing Bosnia in order to
create the opportunity for wiping Republika Srpska from the map and turning the
entirety of the country into an American-Croatian protectorate, or in other
words, the post-modern manifestation of the Hitler-Pavelic project for Greater
Croatia.
Missile
vs. Missile:
This
brings the study to the point of discussing the missile race that’s begun
between Croatia and Serbia. It was reported in mid-October 2015 that Croatia is
planning to purchase 16 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) from the US.
Although
no formal statement was yet to be issued on the topic, it’s predicted that
Croatia will claim that the MLRS are for “defensive” purposes and shouldn’t
trigger worry from anyone, but the fact that they give the country the
capability of striking Serbia is a cause for serious concern.
It’s
perplexing to try and make sense of what’s foreseen to be Croatia’s “defensive”
‘justification’ for the arms purchase considering that the system only has an
offensive purpose. It’s thus not for naught that Serbian Prime Minister Vucic
spoke about his interest in purchasing Russian anti-missile systems and other
equipment during his late-October visit to Moscow, since Serbia now needs to
find a way to nullify this emerging military threat.
Of
course, if Serbia for whatever reason backs out of its verbal commitment to
purchase the Russian arms, then it would automatically place itself in a
position of military blackmail vis-à-vis Croatia (acting as a Lead From Behind
proxy on behalf of the US) and would be powerless to correct the military
imbalance.
Provided
that both transfers go through, then it’s inevitable that the US will push its
Croatian proxy into purchasing different sets of weaponry in order to upset the
strategic equilibrium that Serbia’s Russian-made anti-missile systems would
bring to the region.
This
would beget a symmetrical response from Serbia, thus plunging the two neighbors
into an American-initiated arms race that neither of their two frail economies
might be able to sustain.
In this
sense, Croatia would have an institutional advantage over Serbia since its NATO
membership might entitle it to discounted weaponry that could prove effective
in shifting the military balance, while Serbia has no such agreement with
Russia.
Nonetheless,
in such a case Russia would probably propose an advantageous and deferred
payment plan to allow Serbia to receive the necessary defensive armaments in
maintaining its security.
Cyclically,
one sale leads to another, and before anyone realizes what happened (except of
course the US, which engineered this whole scenario), the Western and Central
Balkans’ strongest militaries are engaged in a spiraling arms race across every
military spectrum, drawing their American and Russian allies closer to a New
Cold War proxy confrontation with the other.
Battleground
Bosnia:
Going
back to the conclusion reached after the historical overview at the beginning
of this subsection, Croatia and its Western backers are working closely with
Sarajevo in engineering the pretexts (whether legal, military, or ‘socially
driven’ through a Color Revolution) to abolish Republika Srpska. Such a
struggle won’t come easy, however, as the Serbs are sure to symmetrically fight
back against any aggressive infringement on their sovereignty, be it legal
and/or military.
Everything
that’s happening right now as regards the Croatian military buildup is
predicated on preparing Zagreb to take the lead in any prospective anti-Srpska
operation, whether through a direct or indirect role.
The Bosnian
Armed Forces are not capable on their own of carrying out the task, considering
also that the Serbian members would immediately mutiny and fight for their
constituent republic as opposed to the overall federation (which is being
hijacked by the Croat-Muslim entity as it is).
Therefore,
from the perspective of American grand strategy in waging the next battle in
the War on Serbia and drawing Belgrade into a Reverse Brzezinski trap, it’s
imperative for it to use Croatia as its vanguard proxy in achieving this
geo-critical objective.
At this
juncture, Croatia’s missile buildup makes complete sense, since it gives Zagreb
the capacity to project force into Serbia to counter any support that Belgrade
gives to Banja Luka.
It’s not
for sure that Croatia would ever directly attack Serbia itself (although it
might feel compelled to if the US pressures it in this direction), but the mere
fact that American missiles could once more rain down on Serbian cities would
certainly affect Serbia’s strategic calculations in this scenario.
If the
country didn’t have adequate defenses for nullifying this threat, then Croatia
would be able to blackmail Serbia and prevent it from directly or indirectly
intervening to support Republika Srpska.
However,
if Serbia’s defenses were buffeted with state-of-the-art Russian-built
anti-missile technology, then Croatia’s blackmail threat instantly disappears
and Belgrade would have a much freer course of action in assisting Republika
Srpska however it deemed fit.
Croatia
would then only have the choice of attacking Serbia directly in face-to-face
aggression either in the Bosnian ‘middle ground’ or directly on its own soil
and risk escalating the war to unforeseen heights.
Depending
on the global New Cold War conditions at the time, the US and NATO might not be
so eager to directly assist in Croatia’s offensive, thus hanging it out to dry
in fighting Serbia on its own.
This
isn’t a risk that Croatia’s decision makers would want to take lightly, thus
meaning that if their surface-to-surface missile blackmail is deterred by
Serbia’s Russian-provided anti-missile defense systems, then it becomes
markedly less likely that they’d directly attack Serbian soil and would
probably contain their aggression to the Bosnian battlespace.
In turn,
this increases the chances that Republka Srpska can withstand whatever joint
Croatian-Muslim offensive is being planned against them, knowing that they can
depend on Serbian assistance if need be without having to fear that their ally
is under ballistic-missile blackmail in being forced to stay on the sidelines.
From a
larger and conclusive perspective,Serbian-Russian military cooperation in balancing
against the Croatian-American buildup might even indefinitely delay a unipolar
offensive on Republika Srpska and give the multipolar world the adequate time
that it needs in brainstorming a solution to this impending brinksmanship.
NATO’s
“Drang Nach Suden”
Southern
Expansionism:
During
the final years of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the US reached a verbal agreement whereby Moscow would allow for the
reunification of Germany in exchange for the US agreeing to never expand NATO
further East.
As
history attests, the US shamelessly reneged on its guarantee the moment the
Soviet Union collapsed and was powerless to effectively stop it, swallowing up
almost the entirety of Eastern Europe (save for Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine)
and all the Baltic States by 2004. What’s less studied by observers is NATO’s
“Drang Nach Suden” (Drive to the South), which represents one of the last
fronts of continental NATO expansionism and has been in the works ever since
the end of the Cold War.
Theoretically
speaking, this corner of Europe didn’t fall under the Soviets’ purvey when they
made their verbal agreement with the US. Moscow didn’t have any forces
stationed in Yugoslavia or Albania that would soon be withdrawn, thus making
these countries’ prospective membership into NATO a moot point for Moscow to
even discuss because it had no power or influence one way or another to even
decide on it.
Faced
with its own internal problems and its forthcoming theater-wide withdraw from
Central and Eastern Europe, it’s likely that the Soviet Union didn’t even
consider the then-unthinkable scenario that a series of American-engineered
proto-Hybrid Wars would soon lead to the dissolution of Yugoslavia along federative
lines and one day see two of its formerly unified members plus Albania under
the NATO nuclear umbrella.
Alas,
that’s exactly what happened, and it can be suggested that one of the US’
partial motivations for dismembering Yugoslavia was to create a chain of
weakened nation-states that would be much easier to absorb into the bloc than
the formerly unified and strong federal entity.
It was
earlier discussed at the beginning of the book’s Balkan research that Slovenia
was the most gung-ho pro-Western state out of the entire former Yugoslavia,
being the first to join both the EU and NATO.
To remind
the reader of what was written at that earlier point, Slovenia was largely
insulated from the chaos of the Yugoslav Wars owing to its advantageous
geography, and its small population was disproportionately well endowed with a
legacy of Yugoslav investment that allowed it to rapidly achieve the highest
GDP per capita of all the former communist countries in Europe.
Consequently,
it joined NATO and the EU in 2004, making it the first Balkan state with
membership in both organizations. This was designed to serve as an
example-setting precedent for other similarly pro-Western regional elite who
wanted to emulate the “Slovenian success story”, leading them to believe that
it was Ljubljana’s impassioned desire to join Western-dominated institutions
that explained its success and not its inimitable geographic, historic, and
economic factors.
Be that
as it was, the deceptive ploy prevailed in convincing the Croatian elite of
their own self-delusions and consequently in furthering their informational
investments in misleading the rest of the population into supporting their
predetermined decision to join both blocs. Zagreb would later enter into NATO
in 2009 and join the EU in 2013, thus following the Slovenian scenario and
dispensing of the tiny Balkan country’s strategic purpose to either
organization (hence the institutional neglect that it’s received from both
since then).
The
situation was a bit different with Albania, as it wasn’t influenced by
Slovenia’s example at all. It joined NATO the same year that Croatia did for
the complementary reasons of supporting the US’ Lead From Behind grand strategy
in the Western Balkans and in placing itself in a more ‘regionally
intimidating’ position for promoting Greater Albania sometime again in the
future (most likely against Macedonia).
Also, it
can’t be discounted that Tirana’s elites were motived to a large degree by
their conception of ‘triumphalism’ in formally allying with the bloc that
bombarded Serbia and led to the temporary severing of its Province of Kosovo.
Taking into account the Albanian understanding of ‘pride’ and how the
Ottoman-era culture of completely disrespecting one’s enemy are still
influential factors that impact on the Albanian psyche, it’s very likely that
one of the country’s driving interests in joining NATO was simply to spite
Serbia.
Waiting
In The Wings?:
Looking
at the rest of the Balkans, every country has some form or another of institutional
relations with NATO.
Serbia
To begin
with, Serbia agreed to an Individual Partnership Action Plan in January 2015, in
an event that bizarrely received barely any publicity in the country’s media.
One would
have been led to believe that Serbia’s closer relations with the same military
bloc that bombed it into submission 16 years prior would garner intense outcry
among the country’s opinion leaders and institutions, but the fact that it
didn’t speaks loudly about the strong entrenchment of influential pro-Western
figures inside the country’s establishment.
Also,
it’s notable that this decision was undertaken under the Vucic’s Premiership,
which has gone to great lengths to please the West. This stands in stark
contrast to the contemporaneous Nikolic Presidency, which has worked hard to
make pragmatic strides in Serbia’s relations with Russia.
The
glaring discrepancy between the foreign policy priorities of the Prime Minister
and the President doesn’t seem to be an elaborate ‘balancing’ ruse between the
West and Russia, but rather a clumsy and disjointed struggle to hash out
compromise between the respective Serbian elites that each figurehead
represents.
This
political predicament is inherently untenable and cannot progress for much
longer without the country being thrown into domestic destabilization.
Pragmatic approaches towards multiple geopolitical directions are welcome for
any country, but when radical moves such as deepening the relationship with
NATO are made, it indicates a decisive power play on behalf of the pro-Western
forces.
Couple
that early-2015 announcement with the news at the end of the year in December
that Belgrade is formally in accession talks with Brussels, and 2015 becomes
the ‘Year of the West’ for Serbia. This can’t help but result in opposition
from the pragmatic voices represented by Nikolic (who is reflective of the
majority of society), which must feel their influence waning amidst Vucic’s
pro-Western advancements.
The
governmental split that’s being produced by Vucic’s unwavering pro-Western
institutional course (continued despite his visit to Moscow and appeal for
Russian weaponry) will inevitably result in an intensification of the ongoing
power struggle between the two factions of the Serbian elite, the
pro-Westernizers and the political pragmatists, unless Vucic tempers his
approach.
Failure
to do so will force the country into the same manipulated “civilizational
choice” that the West imposed on Ukraine in November 2013, which would
ultimately work out to the US’ grand strategic benefit at the expense of every
Serbian.
Provocatively
speaking, it might follow the Ukrainian scenario so closely that a Color
Revolution breaks out in Belgrade, albeit with diametrically different
geopolitical consequences than the pro-Western one that succeeded in Kiev.
Bosnia
Moving
along, Bosnia and the other two remaining Balkan countries that will be
discussed have agreed to Membership Action Plans with NATO, which means that
they have officially committed their governments to a path that’s supposed to
end with NATO membership some time or another.
It’s
practically impossible for this scheme to succeed in Bosnia without a renewal
of civil warfare between Republika Srpska and the Croat-Muslim entity, but more
than likely, that’s the point of Sarajevo pursuing such a farfetched plan. The
Serbs would never accept joining NATO because that would lead to the extinguishment
of their autonomous republic, but reversely, if the autonomy of Republika
Srpska could be revoked (the scenarios of which Sarajevo and its Western
patrons are subtly exploring), then NATO membership would be institutionally
uncontested and incapable of being stopped.
As has
been discussed extensively already, Bosnia is a giant geopolitical time bomb
that’s waiting to be detonated by the West, and Sarajevo’s determined and timed
movement towards NATO could be the spark that lights the next Balkan fuse.
Macedonia
The
surface conviction among many is that Skopje has committed itself to an
irreversible pro-Western trajectory regardless of leadership, and judging by
official statements on the matter, that does indeed seem to be the case.
Digging
deeper, however, and unraveling the changing domestic and international
contexts surrounding Macedonia, the argument can convincingly be made that
there’s more than meets the eye when it comes to Skopje’s pro-Western
institutional associations.
December
2014 forever changed the calculations of the Macedonian leadership because of
the Russia and China’s dual announcements of the Balkan Stream and Balkan Silk
Road megaprojects, respectively, both of which are envisioned to crucially
transit through the country’s territory.
Of
course, neither Great Power would have made such ambitious plans without having
first consulted with the Macedonian government, and Skopje was more than
willing to agree after taking stock of the enormous economic windfall that it
would receive from either project’s successful completion.
Also,
neither Moscow nor Beijing likely made any ultimatums to Skopje for its
cooperation (such as saying that it mustn’t join NATO and/or the EU), but that
it was probably strongly implied that substantially moving forward with either
of these ‘formal’ institutional goals could endanger the projects, and thus,
the geostrategic and economically profitable benefits that Macedonia stood to
incur.
After
discreetly acquiring Macedonia’s advance approval for their initiatives, Russia
and China went public with their regional visions, but this triggered the US to
initiate its back-up regime change plans for the country in order to keep it
firmly in its orbit and pressure it to cancel the multipolar megaprojects.
The US
was probably tipped off to its geopolitical rivals’ plans well in advance and
had begun tinkering with a destabilization scenario in Macedonia long ago,
using it and its allies’ spy agencies to surreptitiously wiretap government and
private citizens for use in a forthcoming political blackmail campaign. In the
months preceding the monumental multipolar announcements relating to Macedonia,
the US ordered its regime change proxy, ‘opposition’ leader Zoran Zaev, to
selectively release suggestive snippets from the Western intelligence
agency-doctored ‘recordings’ in order to test the waters and gauge the public’s
reaction.
After
recognizing that the ‘wiretap’ scenario had the potential to stir a critical
mass of manipulated public unrest (with the hand-in-hand support of
Soros-affiliated organizations and media outlets), the US knew that it had a
powerful tool with which to pressure the government. Prime Minister Gruevski
didn’t fold to Washington’s implied regime change demands, however, and he instead
stood proudly defiant in the face of the externally imposed coup attempt being
pursued against him. At around this time in early 2015, he probably started
getting second doubts about his ‘Western partners’ (if he hadn’t had them
already by this point) and questioning the strategic wisdom of continuing his
country’s established pro-Western course.
At the
same time, being the leader of a super-strategic but comparatively small
country, Gruevski keenly understood his limits of action and came to the conclusion
that forcefully rejecting the West would be contrary to his and his country’s
physical security. This explains why his formal statements are in support of
the unipolar EU and NATO, while his multipolar actions in cooperating with the
Balkan Silk Road and Balkan Stream megaprojects speak more sincerely to the
strategic direction that he truly plans on taking his country.
Gruevski’s
prudence in taking this approach was vindicated after the US attempted an
unsuccessful Hybrid War push against him in May 2015 (Zaev’s failed Color
Revolution intermingled with the Albanian terrorist plots in Kumanovo), showing
the desperate lengths that they were willing to go in getting him removed and
stopping the multipolar megaprojects.
Despite
this obvious regime change attempt and the subsequently more subtle methods
being employed to try and oust him (the EU-mediated ‘negotiations’ with the
‘opposition’ and the forthcoming early elections), Gruevski is still aware that
if he succumbs to the emotional temptation to publicly disown the EU and NATO
in response, then he might fall victim to an assassination attempt (which is
what the plane scare over Switzerland in late-May 2015 was meant to convey to
him).
For these
reasons, the Macedonian Premier must continue his clever game of telling the
West what they want to hear while doing the opposite in practice, although it’s
unclear whether he can continue doing so indefinitely without being forced by
the US into making a resolute choice one way or another.
For the
time being, however, although Macedonia is formally pursuing integration into
Western institutions, its policies in practice are purposely ambiguous, and in
light of the changed domestic and international circumstances that were just
explained, one should hold off on rendering full judgement about Gruevski’s
officially declared commitments until after he gains more freedom of political
maneuverability following the early elections in April.
Fighting
Back:
The final
Balkan country that has yet to be discussed is Montenegro, which just received
its official invitation to join NATO during the bloc’s early-December meeting
in Brussels.
Even
before the announcement was ever formally made, Prime Minister Djukanovic (the
country’s ruler in one form or another for almost the past thirty years)
declared that his country would unreservedly accept NATO membership, prompting
an unprecedented display of public unrest.
The
majority of the 600,000 or so Montenegrin citizens are against their country
joining the same military bloc that bombed it 16 years ago when it was still
part of rump Yugoslavia, and the political opposition has called for the issue
to be put before a referendum. The government refused to accede to their
suggestion and instead responded with disproportionate force that suppressed
the protests and produced an ever stronger reaction of anti-NATO sentiment.
The
result was that the violent crackdown predictably intimidated some of the
population and led to a noticeable decline in their outward protest activity.
This government interpreted this according its preordained expectations and
assumed that this meant that the anti-NATO movement was finished.
That
wasn’t the case, however, since the form of resistance had simply adapted to
the repressive conditions in the country and moved away from large
manifestations in the capital in favor of smaller gatherings in the towns and
villages.
On the
one hand, this was a tactical necessity in order to preserve the protesters’
safety, but on the other, it created the deceptive illusion that the population
had been forced into complacency and may have unintentionally contributed to
NATO going forward with the membership offering, as opposed to withholding it
out of fear that extending the invitation would push the country over the edge
and result in the overthrow of their long-cherished proxy.
As it
stands, it’s expected to take between one to two years for Montenegro for
complete the NATO accession process, meaning that there’s a critical
last-minute window of opportunity for the protesters to make history and be the
first to carry their country away from the organization after it’s already
agreed to join.
Theoretically
speaking, it’s entirely possible for Montenegro to set a new precedent in this
regard, but it’s clear that the only way to do this is by overthrowing the
government or pressuring it to the extent that it acquiesces to a referendum.
Granted, even a public vote might not be enough to stop the NATO machine, since
it’s unsure at this time whether it would be just as crooked of a motion as the
previous ballots held under Djukanovic’s rule.
More than
likely, given the donkey-like obstinacy that Djukanovic and his Mafioso clique
have, plus their propensity to resort to extreme violence amidst pressure, it’s
probable that the only way to reverse the NATO decision is to replace
Djukanovic with a sincere opposition figure that will pull Montenegro out of
the initiation process before it’s fully completed.
Montenegro’s
strategic importance to NATO is disproportionate to its tiny size, and its
membership in the bloc is an important step in bringing Serbia more firmly
under Atlantic control.
Assuming
the most negative scenario where Montenegrins are unable to save their country
from occupation, then NATO would have succeeded in tightening its noose of
encirclement around Serbia and would then feel more confident in making bolder
moves against it and Republika Srpska in the future.
Keep in
mind that Montenegrins are closely related to Serbs and that many Serbs still
live in the country. Officially, the government lists them as being 28% of the
population, but given Djukanovic’s history of statistical manipulations (be it
in the 2006 independence referendum or every election in which he’s ran), the
real percentage is likely higher.
This is
all very important for NATO since they know that they can thus exploit
Montenegro as a ‘social laboratory’ for perfecting informational and other
strategies for use against the larger Serbian demographics in Republika Srpska
and Serbia, thereby giving their campaign in the tiny Adriatic country a
heightened strategic importance that is usually lost on most observers.
With all
that being said, the anti-NATO and anti-government resistance movements in
Montenegro (which are morphing into a unified force at the moment) are
indispensably important in pushing back against NATO’s “Drang Nach Suden”.
Their
success would provide the Central Balkans with strategic breathing space and
stunningly put a sudden halt to the strategic plan that the US had taken for
granted up until that point. Looked at from the opposite perspective, NATO sees
the incorporation of Montenegro as one of the final pieces in completing its
geo-military encirclement of Serbia.
It also
tangentially expects to receive valuable social feedback from this experience
that it can then weaponize against Republika Srpska and Serbia, and the
critical momentum that Montenegro’s accession would create could turn into a
psychological battering ram for diminishing the population’s resistance in
these two states and the Republic of Macedonia.
Due to
the high stakes involved for all sides, it’s doubtful that Djukanovic and his
allies would leave in peace if confronted with a renewed opposition movement
against them, thus raising the disturbing specter that the country might
descend into civil war if its people try to free themselves from impending NATO
domination.
Orban
The Fox
Victor
Orban may not be a wolf in sheep’s clothing, but he’s definitely a fox. He sly
presents himself as a populist voice that outspokenly represents emerging
social norms, placing him at the vanguard of a changing Europe and endearing
him with millions of fawning followers.
There’s
unquestionably a strong degree of institutional resistance from the established
European powers to his raging popularity and iconic status, but by and large,
this ‘old guard’ resistance to the ideals that Orban embodies only makes his
popularity surge even more, and he’s quickly become an iconic and cult-like
figure throughout Central and Eastern Europe, including the Balkans.
A fox is
known for its cunningness, and this trait more than any other aptly describes
the Hungarian Prime Minister. To many, Orban defines a new generation of
‘anti-systemic’ European leaders that are bravely defying the unipolar dictates
of the US and the EU, but upon closer scrutiny, this is all but a carefully
crafted sham (albeit with sincere convictions on Orban’s part) to ‘let the fox
loose in the henhouse’ and undermine multipolar social movements before they
ever have the chance to enact tangible change in Europe.
The
Shifting EU Zeitgeist:
It’s
important for the reader to suitably comprehend the shifting social mood that’s
been underway in Europe for at least the past couple of years. Maligned by the
mainstream media as “Euroscepticism”, it could more accurately be described as
“Euro-caution”, with many people all over the continent progressively becoming
disenchanted with the anti-democratic dictates given to their countries by
Brussels and behaving more reluctantly in following its commands.
Whether
it’s the Greek bailout packages or the current “refugee” crisis to name but two
of most prominent examples, the EU’s actions have struck a raw nerve with a
critical mass of people who no longer endorse the organization in its present
form.
The
radical liberal-progressive ideology and rabid power moves of the past decade
have finally caught up to its technocratic elite, and they’re having to
unexpectedly (for them, at least) contend with rising conservative and
pro-sovereignty resistance to their rule.
The
threat lies in the fact that this organic pan-continental social movement could
become ‘uncontrollable’ and either lead to the EU’s dissolution (whether in
full or in part) or indefinitely cripple its efficiency if a Euro-cautionary
national leader decides to make things difficult and obstruct the
organization’s functioning (the caveat being that the said individual mustn’t
be co-opted by the US and acting under its strategic guidance, whether
purposely or unwittingly).
The
Two-Faced Fraud:
Viktor
Orban, however, took Euro-cautionary steps to cripple the EU when hefenced off
the Hungarian border with Serbia and initiated a chain reaction of border
buffering that unsettled the Balkan region.
The more
prominent aftershocks of this policy indirectly resulted in EU-leader Germany
re-imposing temporary border restrictions with Austria and de-facto violating
the very same principles that it had previously pledged to protect at all
costs.
Partially
as a result of this and other actions, Orban has become the leader of the
anti-“refugee” movement in Europe, taking the strongest and loudest stand of
any EU member in questioning the intentions of these individuals, legally challenging Brussels’ quota resettlement
scheme, and decrying the liberal-progressive ‘religion’ of
‘multiculturalism’ and ‘zero-borders’. In a sense, he’s positioned Hungary as
the underdog in foiling Angela Merkel’s German-led vision of a
liberal-progressive Europe, conservatively proposing a more sovereignty-centric
approach to intra-union affairs and spearheading the way in leading by example.
In
general, Orban’s approach has enjoyed the full backing of his citizenry, as
well as many other distressed Euro-cautionary individuals all across Central
and Eastern Europe, turning him into the normative leader of the EU’s new
nation-centric zeitgeist.
Enchanted
by his fearless rebukes of Brussels and the strength of personality that he has
in carrying out his populist decisions, Orban’s international supporters tend
to overlook his less scrutinized role as a sleazy salesman for NATO
expansionism.
It
was reported in early October that Hungary would host one
of the bloc’s command centers, despite not sharing any border with Russia and
thus invalidating the organization’s stated reasoning for such a facility.
Looked at
in a regional perspective, Romania and Bulgaria are doing the same thing, and
the one point of commonality that they all share is that these countries border
Serbia, one of the only European countries that’s not part of the grouping and
is a key transit state for Balkan Stream and the Balkan Silk Road.
Keep in
mind that Hungary is supposed to be the terminal point for both projects, but
alas, this doesn’t mean that Orban is immune from the temptation to project
influence towards the country that he’ll one day become strategically dependent
on if either project is ultimately completed.
In late
November, Orban announced that he supports NATO membership for
Macedonia, ‘justifying’ his position by saying that while Hungary wants “a
unified economic and security zone, today there is a void between Hungary and
Greece”, implying that it needs to be filled not just by the Macedonia, but
also by Serbia.
Granted,
Hungary is in a much better position to influence the latter than it is the
former, and it could potentially exert pressure on it by inciting ethnic
disturbances in the demographically heterogeneous Autonomous Province of
Vojvodina.
Orban’s
personal motivation wouldn’t be to disrupt the multipolar megaprojects that are
expected to make his country the premier trade and energy hub of Central
Europe, but to use this newfound position to expand Hungary’s influence over
its neighbors and de-facto resurrect a new form of the Hungarian Empire (St. Steven’s Space, as it was referred to earlier).
Of
course, this neo-imperial vision can easily be used by the US as a carrot in
goading Orban along into carrying out his majestic fantasy of national glory in
order to facilitate the ‘unintentional’ obstruction of both projects, with the
Hungarian leader being too blinded by the new nationalism that’s taken hold of
his thinking (and that of Europe in general) to realize that he’s been tricked.
Around
the same time that he was trying to impress Macedonian Prime Minister Gruevski
with his fervent pro-NATO attitude, Orban also met with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and
received a congratulatory pat on the back for all that he has done in stepping
up Hungary’s “collective security” commitment.
What was
being specifically addressed was how Orban increased the country’s defense
budget (with the expectation that some of the new funds will be diverted to
NATO) and ordered his country to participate in the anti-Russian Baltic
“air-policing mission”.
The NATO
chief also thanked Orban for continuing to provide Hungarian troops to the
bloc’s ongoing occupations of Afghanistan and the Serbian Province of Kosovo.
Along the
topic of NATO, Orban’s Foreign Minister attended the early-December summit in Brussels and
helped brainstorm ideas for how the US-led military alliance could get more
heavily involved in the Mideast against ISIL.
Assessed
from a neutral perspective unadulterated by the sway of Orban’s magnetic
political personality and attractive advocacy of social conservatism, it’s
objectively accurate to state that he’s one of the most pro-NATO leaders in the
entire EU, and worse still, he’s also the only one that’s gained enough social
‘trust’ from the Central Balkan people to potentially mislead some of them down
the path of formal American occupation.
Nationalist
Pressures:
It was
earlier stated that Orban, led by his own desires, won’t intentionally do
anything that would make the Balkan Stream and Balkan Silk Road projects
unviable, believing that Hungary has too much to strategically lose than to
foolishly play with fire for no tangible reason whatsoever. The problem arises
when one becomes mindful of just how strong of an influence nationalist thought
has on Orban and the rest of the population at the moment, and herein it’s
necessary to draw a definitive difference with patriotism.
Nationalism
and patriotism are commonly (but improperly) used interchangeably by many
people, unaware that although they might at times manifest themselves in
similar ways, they are conceptually separate strands of thought. Nationalists
tend to be more influenced by racial interests than state-based ones whether
they’re cognizant of this reality or not, and in many of the cases where people
blur the distinction between patriotism and nationalism (like in Hungary), the
country in question has a strong degree of ethnic homogeneity.
Patriotism
differs from the previous by placing a stronger emphasis on the whole country’s
interests, not just those of the titular majority, even if they come off as
contravening the “racial interest” ardently supported by their nationalist
counterparts.
A good
example of this is in Russian Patriots supporting the authorities in the Muslim
and autonomous Chechen Republic despite the majority of the Russian Federation
being ethnic Russians and Orthodox Christian practitioners.
A Russian
Nationalist is absolutely opposed to any form of positive interaction with the
non-Russian, non-Orthodox members of the country’s society, believing that
individuals who don’t share these two demographic traits aren’t worthy of being
part of Russia.
Per this
example, Russian Nationalists are thus predisposed to the racist slogans of
American proxy Alexei Navalny to “stop feeding the Caucasus”, with the
inference that Russia should ‘cut them off’ to become independent countries.
This would lead to the voluntary Brzezinski-esque unravelling of the diverse
Russian state and fulfill the US’ principle geopolitical objective for a
fraction of the cost.
Comparatively,
a Russian Patriot has a vested interest in preserving Russia’s rich cultural,
ethnic, and religious history and not in cutting the country apart based on
identity lines, seeing his motherland’s diversity as a source of its
civilizational strength.
Returning
back to Hungary after clarifying this important difference between concepts,
it’s difficult at the moment to tell whether Orban is a nationalist or a
patriot, since, as was mentioned, his country is one of those hard-to-discern
types where the vast majority of the population is ethnically homogenous.
The deciding
factor in assessing which of the two ideologies he actually adheres to is in
his government’s policies towards the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina, where
they constitute around 13% of the population heavily concentrated near the
border. At this time, Orban hasn’t taken any concrete moves in supporting that
community’s “separateness” from the Serbian state, but the real test will come
if the nationalist Jobbik Party happens to stir up ethnic discontent there and prompts a news-making provocation that he’s
forced to respond to.
Should
this happen, then the Hungarian Prime Minister would find himself in a
political trap of his own making. He has already done so much to promote
nationalism/patriotism (it’s not yet clear which one because of the blur
between them due to Hungary’s demographic situation) that some citizens will
surely be upset at him regardless of what he does because they too were
confused over which ideology Orban had been peddling.
The
nationalists will be distraught to the point of potentially protesting against
him if he doesn’t take strong and forceful anti-Serbian measures in response to
a Jobbik provocation in Vojvodina, whereas patriots will be equally upset with
him if he does, realizing that such a move would endanger Balkan Stream and the
Balkan Silk Road.
The very
zeitgeist that Orban thought he had under his control could unwittingly prove
to be his undoing if the nationalist opposition chooses to put him in the spot
and force his hand one way or the other. Along the same train of thought, the
US could indirectly influence Jobbik in this direction, knowing that their
nationalist ideology makes them gullibly susceptible to being led along such a
route.
The
anti-government protests that could erupt in this scenario would be much more
intense than the ones that preceded them in October 2014. At that time, NGOs
organized thousands of people to march against him after the government levied
a controversial
internet tax, and John McCain even joined in the fray by maligning Orban as
a “neo-fascist
dictator”.
While the
fervor quickly died down after Budapest backtracked on the tax, the message
that the protests sent was clear – the US is more than capable of stirring up
Color Revolution unrest in Hungary if Orban doesn’t fall in line with its
preferred policies.
While
he’s ‘behaving’ himself nice and well for the moment, if he ever does decide to
‘step out of line’ in a significant enough manner, the US could revive the
Color Revolution threat against him, but by replacing the anti-tax protesters
with much more aggressive and violent nationalists, provided of course that
Orban falls deeper into the trap by refusing to go along with the anti-Serbian
provocation scenario that’s set for him.
Predictably,
however, he’ll probably acquiesce to whatever he’s being guided to do, since
the October 2014 Color Revolution scare seems to have made a significant enough
of an impression on him that he’s now promoting NATO to the highest degree.
The
Verdict:
Orban
pretends to be against ‘the system’, but in all actuality, he supports the US’
unipolar deigns in crafty and unexpected ways. His continental popularity stems
mostly from being a vanguard of the evolving strategic paradigm for controlling
post-“refugee” Europe, where nationalism/patriotism (again, the difference
depends on domestic contexts and the individual leader practicing it) are
becoming the order of the day.
The US is
turning away from using liberal-progressives as its agents of choice and is instead
switching to nationalists and fake patriots, with the latter label being used
to describe people who verbally espouse “patriotism” but actually practice
nationalism.
Orban
falls under this category, since he’s deceptively gained much of Central and Eastern
Europe’s trust through his conservative commentary and nationalist actions
regarding the “refugee” crisis, but he’s a Trojan Horse in spreading normative
support for NATO.
It’s too
early to tell if he’ll voluntarily practice his nationalist-NATO policies
towards Serbia or if he’ll have to be tricked into doing so by the US and/or
Jobbik, but there’s a very real possibility that Hungary will one day activate
its ethnic card in Vojvodina for whatever political ends it has in mind (be it
to gain a one-up advantage on ‘upstream’ Serbia or to viciously destroy the
multilateral Balkan Stream and Balkan Silk Road projects).
For these
reasons, while Orban might appear like a willingly enthusiastic multipolar
partner in some respects (and he could very well be serious in his cooperative
intent owing to the strategic-economic advantages that Hungary will predictably
reap), he’s also an easily misled unipolar stooge in others, if not an outright
agent of the US.
HYBRID WARS: CONTAINING CHINA, DISRUPTING
SOUTHEAST ASIA, AMERICA’S VENDETTA AGAINST VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA
Insular
ASEAN has a strategic role in presiding over maritime access points to the
region and beyond, but it’s mainland ASEAN and its political stability that
most directly affect China’s core strategy at the moment. It’s highly unlikely
that circumstances will rapidly change to the point where China is completely
cut off from the South China Sea and the international waterways around it, but
it looks ever case that its access will come under the watchful gaze of the
Chinese Containment Coalition (CCC) and that the potential for
military-strategic blackmail might one day arise.
In
order to counteract this crippling scenario, Beijing is progressively taking
steps to circumvent its full dependence on the waterways and balance this with
a more substantialized on-the-ground infrastructure presence, the ASEAN Silk
Road and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor.
Both of
these ambitious projects were comprehensively discussed at the beginning of the
research’s ASEAN focus, and it’s predicted that the US will go to extraordinary
lengths to disrupt their full implementation. To remind the reader, the Law of
Hybrid War is “to disrupt multipolar transnational connective projects through
externally provoked identity conflicts (ethnic, religious, regional, political,
etc.) within a targeted transit state”, so it naturally follows that Color
Revolution and Unconventional War schemes with be hatched against these
countries in order to stop China’s strategic ‘escape’ from maritime
containment.
There are
essentially three situational theaters in mainland ASEAN – Indochina, Thailand,
and Myanmar – and the research will progress to examining each of these Hybrid
War battlefields in that sequential order.
Indochina
Backgrounder
The first
area to be studied is Indochina, taken to mean the former French colonies of
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. As with the other countries that have been
geopolitically dissected thus far, it’s imperative that the reader first
acquaint themselves with a relevant historical background prior to commencing
the Hybrid War investigations.
This will
imbue the individual with an understanding that allows them to recognize the
utility of certain socio-political variables to the scenarios that are
subsequently described.
The
Indosphere Meets The Sinosphere:
Indochina
lies precisely at the geographic convergence point of Indian and Chinese
civilizations, and as such, there’s actually a clear delineation point between
them inside this subregion. For the most part, Cambodia and Laos fell under Indian cultural influence and their
historical kingdoms were “Indianized” to a broad extent, while Vietnam was
under Chinese control for over a millennium from 111 BC to 938 AD.
The
effect of these separate civilizational forces on such a small geographic area
was to accentuate identity differences between these two adjacent parts, the
legacy of which continues into the present day and is likely to once more
become a driving factor in forthcoming events.
By itself,
the civilizational separateness that “Indianized” Cambodia and Laos feel
towards “Sinified” Vietnam wouldn’t coalesce into a sufficient agent for
political action on its own, but the historical trend of Vietnamese
expansionism at their expense (some of it subjectively so, other parts only
perceived as such) reveals itself to be the catalytic cause.
Neither
country outright rejects Vietnamese influence, nor are they in an economic
position to do so even if they wanted to, but the point is that their history
of relations with Vietnam undoubtedly plays a role in why these two states want
to diversify away from their former mono-dependence on their neighbor
(experienced from 1975-1991) and achieve a balance through complementary
relations with civilizationally similar Thailand and economically expanding
China.
Caught
In The Middle:
Being
situated between their larger Thai and Vietnamese neighbors, Cambodia and Laos
have historically been under pressure from both of these powers and eventually
turned into the object of their conquests.
The
golden age that each of these modern-day states had prior to their submission
came during the era of Cambodia’s Khmer Empire and Laos’ Lan
Xang kingdom, stretching between 802-1431 and 1354-1707, respectively.
After that, each of these once-glorious entities fell under the control of
the Kingdom of Ayyuthaya, nowadays referred to as Thailand.
Vietnam
didn’t become a significant player in the rest of Indochina until after it
completed its centuries-long “Nam
tiến”, which was the state’s piecemeal incorporation of the southern parts
of the country that only ended in the early 1800s.
Siamese
Ebb, Vietnamese Flow:
After
Vietnam’s contemporaneous consolidation, it fought two wars with Thailand
from 1831-1834 and1841-1845 over Cambodia, but the object of their
mutual rivalry eventually requested French “protection” in 1867 and
threw off both of its neighboring rivals.
It became
France’s second colony after “Cochinchina”, the southern part of Vietnam, fell
to an invasion and was occupied by the Empire a couple years earlier in 1862. Just a little over three decades later, Laos was
added to the list of French conquests in 1893 following the Franco-Siamese War
of the same year.
With
their Indochinese imperial realm acquiring a great deal of strategic depth and
coming to encompass almost the entirety of its eventual territory, the French
were in a comfortable position to accelerate the economic exploitation of their
colonies, with a concentrated focus on what is today Vietnam.
It should
be noted, however, that modern-day Vietnam was actually divided into three
separate colonies by the French – Tonkin, Amman, and Cochinchina – but taken as
an aggregate, Vietnam’s colonial economic output was much more valuable to
Paris than Cambodia and Laos’.
The
period of French Indochina was also the first time that these two states were
grouped together under the same umbrella as Vietnam, heralding a state of
affairs that would go on to continue with various ups and downs until the end
of the Cold War.
World
War II And Greater Thailand:
Indochina
was largely spared from the ravages of Japan’s traditional wartime occupational
practices, although by no means was it totally immune. Still, Tokyo had less of
a militant presence in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos than it did in Indonesia and
the Philippines, for example, and the entire territory of French Indochina
remained under their control until the end of the war.
What’s
notable about this period though isn’t necessarily the influence that Japan
exercised over the former French colonies, but the role that Thailand played in
reasserting its territorial claims eastward.
Field
Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram (popularly known as Phibun) became Prime
Minister of Thailand in 1938 and led his country on an irredentism campaign to
re-annex parts of Cambodia and Laos after the Franco-Thai War from 1940-1941.
He
also expanded Thailand’s territory into northeastern Myanmar’s
present-day Shan State and the northern territories of Malaysia, all of
which he claimed used to be part of his kingdom prior to the advent of
colonialism.
Thailand
was able to get away with all of this because it was an ally of fascist Japan
at the time, and it wasn’t until 1946 that it rescinded all of its irredentist
claims as part of a deal in exchange for joining the UN.
Despite
representing an outburst of militant Thai nationalism, this brief period was
not overly influential in determining the future attitudes of Cambodians and
Laotians towards Bangkok, partly because of the civilizational similarities
between all three peoples and also due to the fact that only portions of their
respective territory (and not all of it) were annexed. Another factor that
played a role was that the annexations were only in effect for five years.
After
World War II, Vietnam’s influence replaced Thailand’s and remained the
paramount social factor impacting on these two countries’ affairs.
The
First And Second Indochinese Wars:
The
struggle against the French and Americans was a heroic one of epic proportions,
and readers should look more into it on their own time if they have an interest
in these exploits.
For the
sake of time and scope, the summarized relevance of this period of time to the
research at hand is that it represented the on-the-ground expansion of (North)
Vietnamese influence into Cambodia and Laos, with the Vietnamese communists
training and supporting their Khmer Rouge and Pathet Laos counterparts during
the entire conflict.
In fact,
if it wasn’t for crucial support from Hanoi, neither Phnom Penh nor Vientiane
would have cast off their respective pro-Western governments, with all three
countries liberating themselves from imperialism in full during the dramatic
year of 1975.
Alas, the
conclusion of these two anti-imperialist wars weren’t a harbinger for the end
of the region’s conflicts in general, and a few forthcoming ones would soon
break out that would derail Indochina’s dynamics.
Post-Imperialist
Conflicts:
Vietnam
vs. Cambodia
The first
war that broke out after the end of the anti-imperialist struggle was the one
between Vietnam and Cambodia in 1978-1979. Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge
government had turned on its former Vietnamese benefactors and began
aggressively demanding territorial revisions in southern Vietnam’s Mekong Delta
region.
The
supposed reasoning for this is that the lands of the late Cochinchina had
historically been inhabited by ethnic Khmer (the majority demographic in
Cambodia) and were only forcibly incorporated into Vietnam after the end of Nam
tiến.
There
were also intra-communist Cold War considerations at play too, with Vietnam and
its Laotian ally being aligned with the Soviet Union, while Cambodia’s Khmer
Rouge authorities were very close to China (partly in order to balance against
Vietnam’s 19th-century historic interests over the country).
Although
Vietnam righteously and quite accurately claimed that it was liberating
Cambodia from the genocidal rule of the Khmer Rouge (which had killed up to a
quarter of the country’s population in only four years’ time), it’s clear in
retrospect that it was also pursuing clear geopolitical interests at the same
time, installing a pro-Vietnamese government in Pol Pot’s wake and
bringing the country fully under its influence as a result.
Vietnam
vs. China
As an
immediate response to the overthrow of China’s regional ally, Beijing invaded the northern part of Vietnam in mid-February
1979, intent on punishing its erstwhile partner and sending the strongest
possible message that it totally denounced its actions. Neither side gained
anything tangible from this brief but bloody campaign, but it’s worthwhile to
remind the reader that this conflict occurred after China had already de-facto
sided with the US in the Cold War.
Seen from
this vantage point of contextual insight, it’s evident that Beijing was enforcing
Washington’s will by proxy against its hated Vietnamese enemy, whether it
wittingly did so or was unknowingly guided into this scenario.
The
exacerbation of intra-communist Cold War tension between China and the USSR
also played to the US’ grand strategic advantage, and it was shortly after this
conflict ended that the US took the decision to provocatively arm the Afghan Mujahedin on 3 July, 1979
in order to provoke a Soviet intervention.
In the
grand global scheme of things, China had put the Soviets’ position in Southeast
Asia on the relative defensive while also ensuring that it would redirect a
sizeable number of its forces to defending the joint border.
Concurrently,
the US started using radical Islam to stir up trouble in the USSR’s southern
front with Afghanistan, and it was only one year later in 1980 that the
anti-Soviet,CIA-influenced Solidarity movement would be created in
order to tempt an Afghan-like intervention in Eastern Europe.
Taken
together, the situationally coordinated anti-Soviet advances that had popped up
in this short two-year period in Southeast Asia, the Chinese frontier,
Afghanistan, and Poland are evidence that the US was serious in influencing a
concerted effort aimed at destabilizing the USSR along as many of its strategic
fronts as possible.
Seeing as
how this also coincided with the “Reagan
Doctrine” of ‘rolling back’ the Soviet influence in Africa (e.g. Ethiopia,
Angola, and Mozambique) and Latin America (Nicaragua), it can be said that the Sino-Vietnamese
War was actually the opening salvo in this forthcoming worldwide campaign.
Vietnamese-Thai
Border Skirmishes
After militarily withdrawing from Indochina, the US resorted to using
Thailand as itsLead From Behind to promote their strategic vision in
the region. Both Washington and Bangkok supported the Khmer Rouge and other insurgents against
the Cambodian-based Vietnamese forces and newly installed pro-Hanoi government,
effectively giving the Cambodian
Civil War the foreign support that it needed to continue indefinitely.
As part
of its anti-insurgent campaign, the Vietnamese military would launch raids
along the joint Thai-Cambodian border, even engaging in select cross-border
attacks against fleeing militants.
The
tensions that boiled up with Vietnam all along Thailand’s southeastern border
with Cambodia would later directly express themselves in the Thai-Laotian Border War of 1987-1988, during which
Bangkok and Vientiane (the latter supported by the Vietnamese forces that were
based in the country) had a brief military conflict over their disputed
frontier.
Despite
not resulting in any status quo changes, the incident was symbolic in the sense
that it showed that the entire Thai-Indochinese border region was ‘fair game’
for proxy conflicts, especially considering that the Vietnamese military was
based in both Cambodia and Laos at the time.
The
escalation of border tension with Laos was significant in that it occurred at
the period of time when hostilities between Thailand and Vietnam were subsiding
over Cambodia, thus showing that the US-backed authorities in Bangkok were
insistent on advancing their anti-Vietnamese goals in some form or another no
matter what third-party state was used to achieve these ends.
Interestingly
enough, the US’ proxy policy of Southeast Asian destabilization via its Lead
From Behind partner of Thailand carries with it a strong foreshadowing of what
would later happen in the Mideast after the formal US military withdrawal in
2011. Just as the US withdrew from South Vietnam in 1973 but later used
Thailand as its base of covert operations to destabilize its regional foe, so
too did it do something similar by withdrawing from Iraq in 2011 but using
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar to continue promoting its
anti-Syrian and anti-Iranian agendas, albeit in a more accelerated manner than
it had done vis-à-vis Vietnam.
Therefore,
clear links of strategic continuity can be witnessed between the US’ Cold War
policy in Indochina after 1973 and its current one in the Mideast after 2011,
with both being characterized by an asymmetrical proxy offensive that follows a
conventional retreat.
Indochina
After The Cold War:
The
changing global dynamics brought about by the end of the Cold War had a
monumental impact on Indochina. First off, the most noticeable change was that
Vietnam formally withdrew its military from Cambodia and Laos, thereby lessening the direct expression of its
influence over these two neighboring states.
In turn,
Vietnam was able to concentrate its focus on internal economic affairs as
opposed to external military-political ones, and the Western community lifted its anti-Vietnamese sanctions that were
initially implemented in response to the 1978 Vietnamese-Cambodian War and
subsequent military presence there.
Due to
the institutional relief that Vietnam experienced from this and the positive
reaction that the pro-Western members of the region had to these dual
developments, Hanoi was able to rapidly incorporate itself into the global
economy, joining ASEAN in 1995 and establishing very close trade ties with the
US, Japan, and South Korea afterwards.
Cambodia
and Laos would go on to join ASEAN as well, albeit in 1999 and 1995,
respectively. Instead of moving closer to the US and its East Asian allies,
however, they would actually opt to intensify full-spectrum relations with
China and Thailand. While both maintain cordial and somewhat close ties with
Vietnam (Laos much more so than Cambodia), it can subjectively be assessed that
they are no longer as strongly under its influence as they once were.
Laos
is integrating itself into the ASEAN Silk Road and
becoming the literal link between China and Thailand, whereas Cambodia has blossomed into a bastion of Chinese economic and
diplomatic influence.
The
current governments of these two Indochinese states are firmly in the sphere of
the multipolar world, with their position exponentially increased by Thailand’s
new pro-multipolar leadership.
That
isn’t to say that Vietnam isn’t somewhat multipolar as well, seeing as how it
beneficially cooperates with Russia in the economic and military realms,
but overall the country has come under the strong influence of the unipolar
anti-Chinese states of the US and Japan, with the TPP being the ultimate
epitome.
Going
forward, it’s expected that Vietnam will balance its South China Sea maritime
strategy with ambitious asymmetrical mainland inroads into its former
‘backyards’ of Cambodia and Laos, partly out of its own desire to economically
entrap these two states into its subregional TPP influence zone, but also due
to the US’ strategic guidance in using Hanoi’s historical proxy leadership over
them to complicate China’s One Belt One Road plans.
The
Vendetta Against Vietnam
Vietnam
is currently one of the US’ closest strategic partners in the South China Sea,
with bilateral relations on the strong upswing out of the shared economic
interests and the joint vision of containing China. While ties are
unprecedentedly positive between these two states, Vietnam might one day begin
reasserting its strategic sovereignty against the US vis-à-vis a possible
improvement of relations with China.
That
doesn’t look all that probable in the given moment, but it certainly can’t be
disregarded, especially since China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner and likely will remain so for
at least the rest of the decade (despite the TPP and barring any anti-Chinese
sanctions over the Spratly Islands dispute).
In the
event that Vietnam more pragmatically engages China and perhaps even chooses to
fully participate in the One Belt One Road project, then it would draw the
strong consternation of the US, whether this is publicly expressed or relegated
to backdoor talks.
Just as
the US stands to manipulate domestic Hybrid War factors in the presently
pro-American countries of insular ASEAN, so too could it do so in Vietnam if
Hanoi doesn’t behave as “loyally” as Washington envisions it to be.
One of
the possible ‘symptoms’ of an assuredly sovereign state policy would be if
Vietnam refuses to go along with some of the US’ CCC practices, for which it
would obviously experience certain punitive repercussions.
For this
reason, it’s useful to explore what kind of destabilization potentials exist in
Vietnam and game out the various means for how the US could possibly manipulate
them if its newfound ally wavers in its strategic anti-Chinese commitment.
The six
most realistic variables and scenarios can be categorized into those that deal
with ethnic, regional, and social divides, and they will be examined in that
order below. The ethnic groups function as support actors, while the social
ones are expected to be the primary ones that take the lead in sparking the
destabilization.
The
regional divide that’s explained below allows for a supportive and encouraging
backdrop for ideological predisposed or indoctrinated individuals, and it also
creates high hopes for those that are already entertaining anti-systemic
notions.
Ethnic:
Khmer Krom
A little
more than one million Khmer inhabit the southern reaches of Vietnam, and in the
past their presence was used by Pol Pot as justification for Cambodia’s
historic claims over the Mekong Delta.
While the
issue itself has largely receded in the decades since Vietnam put a stop to the
aggression in 1979, it still remains possible that this demographic could be
used in some manner to stir local anti-government discontent. As it currently
stands, the Cambodian government is anathema to such suggestions, both out of
multipolar pragmatism and stark remembrance of how disastrously it turned out
last time around, but that doesn’t mean that a third-party actor (either the US
directly or via one of its many NGO pawns) could do aggravate the situation
instead.
There’s
no practical way that the Khmer Krom could ever destabilize the whole of
Vietnam, but a coordinated campaign could be implemented to use them as bait
for provoking a military crackdown that leads to collateral damage against
ethnic Vietnamese and/or international condemnation, especially if this
scenario is mixed with a labor rights dispute of some sort.
What’s
pivotal in this example is that the Khmer Krom, separate in culture and
language from the majority Viet ethnicity, are vulnerable to identity
mobilization and thenceforth to being led into a bloody confrontation with the
state, with the end result of the clashes (collateral damage, misleading media
exposure) being more important than whatever short-term aims the ethnic group
had been misled into coalescing around.
Hmong
Infamous
for their collaboration with the US military during the Vietnam
War, this scattered ethnic group poses a joint destabilization threat to both
Vietnam and Laos.
The Hmong
are divided
through dialect but united through geography, occupying a crescent of
territory from northern Vietnam into northeast Laos. There are estimated to
be over one million Hmong in Vietnam and less than half
of that in Laos, so altogether they only form a recognizable percentage of the
population in the latter (which has about 6.7 million people).
The
Hmongs’ significance derives from their identity in being a restive,
anti-communist demographic with experienced cross-border travel between Vietnam
and Laos, raising the tactical prospects that they could once more be used
for drug and/or weapons
smuggling.
While the
ones that remained in both countries after the US retreat have mostly been
re-incorporated into society, if they were to resort back to their illegal
transnational practices (whether being contracted by an intelligence agency to
do so or out of their own pursuit of profit), they could create some trouble in
this rugged and underpopulated frontier despite their miniscule numbers.
Strategically
speaking, any eruption of instability in Laos could then more easily spill over
into Vietnam, with the Hmong communities once more plying their militant trade
across the border and potentially arming distressed factory workers that are
preparing for a local, regional, and/or nationwide uprising.
Just like
with the Khmer Krom, the Hmong by themselves are not in any position to
destabilize Vietnam aside from being an isolated nuisance, but if their
specific on-the-ground advantages are utilized in a certain manner, then they
could be used as a force multiplier in any larger unfolding scenario.
Degar/”Montagnard”
These
mutually synonymous terms are used to refer to the native people of the Western
Highlands. These Christianized tribal groups were allied with the French and US
forces during the First and Second Indochinese Wars, and in terms of
geopolitical importance, they abut the country’s borders with Cambodia and Laos
and are located at a critical position in the country’s south.
They have
a history of rebelling against all aspects of Vietnamese rule, be it from the
former South or the current reintegrated state, and they partook in a low-intensity
anti-government insurgency that wasn’t disbanded until 1992.
The Degar
join the likes of their fellow Khmer Krom and Hmong minority compatriots in
being unable to affect significant disturbances on their own (especially with
the current Cambodian government being unwilling to offer them any type of
sanctuary to do so), but having the opportunity to maximize the potential of
other destabilization scenarios if their actions are coordinated in sync.
For
example, if the 2001 “land rights” unrest and 2004
Easter protests (both of which were instigated from abroad) were to
repeat themselves in some form concurrent with violent labor disputes elsewhere
in the country, then it could possibly offset the authorities and create an
opening for asymmetrical advances such as a renewed insurgency.
Furthermore,
Degar destabilizations could ultimately lead to a large refugee flow into
Cambodia if they end up failing, and this carries with it a risk to the
Kingdom’s overall balance. The northeastern provinces bordering the Western
Highlands are rural and mostly underpopulated, so it’s possible that this
demographic could exploit the feeble governance there in order to set up
anti-Vietnamese training camps.
For now,
at least, this doesn’t seem likely at all, but if Phnom Penh were in the midst
of putting down its own anti-government riots (likely initiated under the cover
of a labor revolt and to be explained in the relevant section), then it could
be expected that this might occur to some extent.
Regional:
The days
of a distinct division between North and South Vietnam are long gone, but
certain socio-cultural differences still remain between the two. The
reunification of the two entities after 1975 was fraught with many challenges,
but none so more difficult than integrating the formerly capitalistic market of
the South into the state-controlled system of the North.
After
experiencing some economic turbulence related to this undertaking and feeling
the winds of American-supported global change that were sweeping across the
world, the Vietnamese authorities decided to progressively open up their
economy through the 1986 Doi Moi reforms. What’s ironic about this is that it
represented an about-face for the communist state, which had just gone through
great lengths to implement a strict top-down system in the South, but only to
retreat from this policy about a decade later.
Other
than some of the global and structural factors that were at play and exerting
an undeniable impact, it’s unmistakable that Southern-based liberals also had a
role over this decision. It’s not to insinuate that they had any ulterior
motives in doing so, but that they genuinely believed from their experience
that the economic model previously in place in South Vietnam was relatively more
efficient than the one that they were later ordered to transition into by the
North.
No matter
the degree of influence that the Southern liberals had over initiating the Doi
Moi reforms, the fact remains that they were a comparative reversal of the
previous system and an embrace of capitalist principles, the same operating
structure that had earlier been in place in the South.
The
pertinence of that period to the present is that the pro-Western economic
thinking of that time is once more on the ascent in Vietnam, and with it, the
possibility of a complementary pro-Western foreign policy.
The last
time that Hanoi followed the lead of Western influencing factors in the
mid-1980s, it ended up unassumingly doing the West’s foreign policy bidding a
few years later by withdrawing from Cambodia and Laos at the end of the Cold
War.
This
time, Vietnam is on the verge of entering into the forthcoming TPP arrangement,
and it’s playing a more militant role in the CCC hand-in-hand with this
development. Whereas in the past it may have been contextually pragmatic for
Vietnam to implement Doi Moi and remove its troops from the rest of Indochina,
no such rationale can be evoked when it comes to the TPP and the CCC, both of
which Vietnam is lunging into head-first.
It’s the author’s
understanding that the 1980s Doi Moi and Cambodian and Laotian withdrawals
symbolized the victory of the ‘spirit of the South’, or in other words, of
certain policies that wittingly or unwittingly corresponded to Western
preferences.
In the
same vein, joining the TPP and the CCC, and perhaps reinvigorating soft
(economic) Vietnamese influence in Cambodia and Laos, accomplishes the same
thing, albeit this time in full and witting compliance to the US’ regional
vision.
Therefore,
the regional differences in Vietnam are less of a geopolitical nature and more
of an ideological one, with the North (in ideas, not necessarily in terms of
actual politicians) typically representing independent pragmatism, whereas the
South symbolizes pro-Western bandwagoning.
Ultimately,
it’s the rivalry between these two camps that defines the current state of
Vietnam’s international economic and political decision making, with the South
obviously in charge at the moment. Should that change, then it’s likely that
the US would fall back on utilizing the country’s ethnic and/or social
destabilization variables in order to enact pro-Southern pressure on the
government to bring it back in line with its CCC preferences.
Social:
Banned
Religious Groups
One of
the largest social disruptors in Vietnam could potentially come from the
religious community in the country. Freedom of religion is guaranteed in
Vietnam per the 1992 Constitution, and the country currently boasts a belief rate of around 46%, with 16%
practicing Buddhism, 8% partaking in Christianity (be it Catholicism or
Protestantism), and the rest following unorganized traditional beliefs.
On the
whole, these individuals are peaceful and apolitical, and it’s very rare for
regular believers to encounter any sort of trouble from the state. The issue
arises when adherents of banned Buddhist and Christian organizations such as
the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam and the Vietnam
Evangelical Fellowship, to name just two of them, illegally gather for
services and proselytization practices.
As a
general rule, such groups are banned because they have a track record of
engaging in political practices, and this is why they could present such a
difficult challenge for the authorities if they go out of control.
To expand
on this idea, so-called “religious freedom” is a powerful rallying cry for
indoctrinated individuals and those susceptible to Western liberal-democratic
thought. The general concept holds that governments should unrestrictedly allow
any and all religions to be practiced, including obscure cult beliefs
affiliated or unaffiliated with a major religion.
Obviously,
the individuals experiencing some type of state restriction on their religious
practices (whether semi-conventional or outright cultish) are the ones most
eager to reverse this state of affairs, and they may go about recruiting
related co-confessionalists (as in the case of the banned Buddhist and
Christian organizations) in order to assist them in this endeavor.
At this
point, what’s important to concentrate on is broader religious affiliation (be
it Buddhist, Christian, or sympathy to both) being used as a mobilization issue
for non-state agenda-driven actors.
It
doesn’t matter whether they use their socio-physical networks to agitate
against state atheism and certain religious “restrictions” or any other object
of protest, since the saliency lies in them simply organizing a critical mass
of demonstrators that can ultimately disrupt the state’s stability.
Another
critical component of this disruption strategy is that the religious-driven
organizations and their affiliates could easily mislead their congregants to
the conclusion that the only way for them to achieve their goals is through a violent
overthrow of the state.
They
might point to “state-suppression” of their prior ‘activism’ as ‘evidence’ that
working within the system is futile, thus compelling them to resort to Color
Revolution and Unconventional Warfare practices (Hybrid War) in order to
actualize their objectives when the time is right. While keeping their faith
and religiously motivated end goal of regime change a secret, they can then
take to recruiting other citizens to join their ‘dissident’ cause, most likely
using a more encompassing and non-religious rallying issue such as workers’
rights to broaden their movement’s base.
There’s a
high chance that the majority of people brought into this fold might not be
aware of the regime change purposes of the growing underground movement, being
guided instead into thinking that they’re lending their support to a
short-term, low-intensity protest movement about a seemingly ‘legitimate’ issue
such as workplace safety. Unbeknownst to them, they’re actually being attached
to a preplanned provocation that will inevitably result in violence, with the
most ardent of the religious believers leading the way in sparking the militant
conflict against the authorities.
To
summarize the strategic framework that’s been articulated above, select members
of the banned religious community in Vietnam and their supportive
state-approved counterparts could quite easily band together in building a
covert anti-government network.
The more
radical of the bunch could have already been convinced that the only way to
affect the tangible change that they’re aiming for is to violently overthrow
the government, and they’ll probably keep these intentions hidden from the more
moderate members of the group.
Even if
this religiously affiliated organization sought to commence a destabilizing
protest or an outright putsch, they’d likely fail without garnering enough
supporters in advance. Since it can safely be assumed that the vast majority of
Vietnamese are against a violent overthrow of their government, the only way to
get them to physically support the regime change movement is to conceal its
ultimate intentions, using more inclusive and broad-based language such as
protecting/advancing labor rights and other non-religious issues that the
majority of people could relate to in order to motivate them enough to come out
in the street with their support.
Even
then, it’s not guaranteed that the scheme will appeal to enough people to make
it effective, but the vehemence of the religiously motivated core organizers
might be enough to give it some gusto.
Labor
Rights Activists
The final
Hybrid War factor impacting on Vietnam is also the most important, and it deals
with the forthcoming institutionalized unionization in the country.
One of
the TPP’s precepts is that it mandates that Vietnam “legalize independent labor unions
and workers’ strikes”, which in and of itself is certainly a welcome and positive
gesture, but considering the regime change reputation that Washington has
mustered, such a seemingly innocuous and well-intentioned prerequisite must
defensively be viewed with the utmost suspicion.
The
author doesn’t intend to imply that all labor unions and workers’ strikes are
potentially nefarious fronts for anti-government plots, but that under certain
national conditions, there’s no doubt that they could be used as vehicles for
advancing this agenda.
Vietnam
has been dragged into a stereotypical dilemma – on the one hand, it needs to
ensure and better workers’ rights and conditions, but at the same time, it
needs to prevent its reforms from being abused by politically motivated actors.
The crux
of the problem is that the state waited so long to legalize these labor
privileges, so that neither it nor the citizenry fully know what to expect.
Hanoi is predicating its decision on the notion that this move will strengthen
the government’s appeal and preempt socio-economic disturbances, but it might
inadvertently end up weakening its power over the country and ushering in the
same type of destabilization that it hopes to avoid.
It’s
inevitable that some of the unions will be co-opted by politically motivated
elements or outright created as front organizations for them, yet their
magnetic appeal and the popular acceptance that they’re expected to attain in
Vietnamese society could indicate that an uncontrollably large segment of the
population might vehemently be in support of them.
As was
earlier stated, there’s nothing inherently wrong with labor unions, but from
the Hybrid War perspective, these groups are capable of gathering a large
amount of people and assembling highly charged and easily manipulatable crowds
that could be turned against the government.
For
example, if the unions and their supporters enter into a confrontation with the
authorities (which is bound to happen in any organized labor dispute and/or
strike) and provocateurs steer the situation along a preplanned scenario of
violence, then the government reaction, no matter how justified it may be, could
end up upsetting many people and enflaming anti-government sentiment.
There’s
no clear-cut solution to handling this dilemma, and it’s obvious that both the
state and the citizenry will have to learn as they go along. As regards the
government, it needs to be able to identify the difference between a peaceful
and legitimate labor-related protest and one which is on the verge of bubbling
into an anti-government riot. It also needs to learn how to handle such
incidents so that it doesn’t unwittingly do more harm than good in the tactics
that it uses in breaking such demonstrations up.
Alternatively,
the public needs to get a handle on what sorts of behaviors are acceptable and
which aren’t, and legitimate protesters need to learn how to police their own ranks
to root out any provocateurs before they have the chance to act.
The
issue, as mentioned previously, is that neither side has the necessary
experience to engage in this sort of civil society discourse without there
being some unavoidable ‘growing pains’ such as Color Revolution infiltration
and/or overreactive government crackdowns, both of which may serve to
exacerbate preexisting anti-state sentiment and advance an externally directed
regime change scenario.
Out of
all of the variables discussed thus far, the “labor rights activist” one is the
most all-encompassing, since it can conceivably envelop most of the working-age
population within its ranks in some form or another.
It
doesn’t matter if they’re card-carrying members or sympathetic citizens, what’s
important for the Hybrid War observer to realize is that the banner of labor
rights is capable of organizing millions of people for the same shared
objective, and that this critical mass of individuals can be guided against the
government by adept practitioners of crowd-control psychology.
Put
another way, an untold number of regular, law-abiding, and well-intentioned
citizens could get drawn into participating in what they believe to be a labor
rights-focused protest, but only to in effect function as human shields
protecting a radical core of urban terrorists that are intent on attacking the
state.
These
political and/or religious radicals aim to provoke ‘incriminating’ and
visually-documented police-on-protester violence that could then deceptively be
disseminated as ‘truth’ and used to help recruit more people into the growing
anti-government movement.
Along the
same lines, nationwide or strategically focused regional labor disputes and
strikes could be used to enact economic war against a targeted state from
within, especially if the “union” has been co-opted by externally directed
anti-government elements or is an outright front organization for them. In the
circumstances where this is the case, the external actor (in mostly every
imaginable situation, this would be the US and its intelligence/NGO apparatus)
can inflict a two-for-one destabilization against their target.
If the
state is compelled to violently crack down on the rioters in order to restore
order, then this could be manipulated against it via the social and physical
anti-government ‘activist’ networks in generating even more dissatisfaction
against the authorities; but at the same time, if the government doesn’t react
and it allows the labor dispute and/or strike to continue indefinitely, then it
risks experiencing a prolonged economic loss, especially if the factory,
industry, and/or locale chosen for the disruption is of a strategic nature. In
both instances, there isn’t a ‘win-win’ solution for the authorities, and
they’re pressed to choose what they believe will be the lesser of two evils.
Putting
the state on the defensive and forcing it to continuously react to these sorts
of strategic lose-lose dilemmas are precisely the sort of tactics that Hybrid
War practitioners specialize in. No matter what specific form they take or
whatever particular issue the infiltrated or front organization claims to
support at the time (be it labor rights, “free elections”, or the environment,
for example), the indisputable pattern is that they always find a way to lure
as many civilians into their ranks as possible in order to use them as human
shields and ‘collateral damage’ for their preplanned anti-government
provocation.
The next
step follows naturally enough, and it’s that the average citizen who hears
about what happened (either on their own or via a nifty NGO-directed social
media campaign) starts to lose faith in the government, largely unaware that
what they had seen or read was totally staged and/or guided to occur by a
foreign intelligence agency.
The
compound effect of this occurring on a large enough scale and with a certain
context-specific frequency is that the population begins to either actively
turn against the authorities and/or passively comes to accept the individuals
that are fighting against them and whatever new state entity emerges in the
wake of the current one’s possible defeat.
The
Chances For A Hybrid War Crisis In Cambodia
Moving
along in the book’s examination of Hybrid War threats in mainland ASEAN, it’s
time now to turn to Cambodia, the first of the studied states to most likely be
in the US’ regime chance crosshairs.
Up until
this point, the research was addressing countries where engineered Hybrid War
scenarios were possible only in the event that their governments strayed from
the general anti-China line (to varying degrees of rhetoric and form) that the
US had ‘preferred’ that they abide by.
Cambodia
is a completely different matter altogether, since it’s the first ASEAN state
that the book addresses in which bilateral relations with China are at an
extraordinarily high level.
Although
not a key node in Beijing’s primary ASEAN Silk Road from Kunming to Singapore,
there are plans in motion to make it a supporting spoke, and the close ties
between Beijing and Phnom Penh have drawn the ire of the US.
Cambodia
occupies a strategic position in China’s ASEAN strategy, and thereby it’s
likely that it will experience some sort of renewed regime change
destabilization in the coming future despite not being a chief transit state
for Beijing’s transnational connective infrastructure designs.
Additionally,
the US is aware of the strategic regional advantages that it would gain from
overthrowing Cambodia’s current government, and these calculations further
increase the odds that long-serving Prime Minister Hun Sen might become
Washington’s next regime change target.
This
segment of the research begins by explaining the geopolitical significance that
Cambodia has to China and the mainland ASEAN region.
Afterwards
it looks into the present political situation in the country and highlights the
determined efforts of the ‘opposition’ in trying to topple Hun Sen.
Finally,
the last part draws attention to the most realistic Hybrid War scenario facing
Cambodia, which just like in Vietnam, is the infiltration of the labor rights
movement and its hijacked repurposing into the optimal regime change
instrument.
Why
Strategists Care About Cambodia:
The
average reader might be perplexed about why ASEAN’s poorest state has any
significance whatsoever in terms of Great Power planning, but the answer lies
no so much in economics (although there’s plenty of opportunity there, as will
later be explained), but in geopolitics.
This is
partly explained by China’s historical relations with Cambodia and general strategy
towards ASEAN, but it’s also due to the demographic and state-to-state
destabilization potential that Cambodia could potentially release towards its
neighbors if it ever became a pro-American satellite state.
The
China Factor
The most
important issue to address in describing Cambodia’s geostrategic significance
is its relationship with China. In the eyes of Beijing’s decision makers,
Cambodia occupies a similar geopolitical importance to China as Serbia does to
Russia, in that the strong partnership between the two allows the Great Power
to ‘jump’ past a wall of obstructionist states. In the instance of mainland
ASEAN, these historically had been Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam, with the first
two actually becoming pretty pragmatic towards China since the end of the Cold
War.
Even if
those two diplomatic successes hadn’t been achieved, the relationship with
Cambodia allows China to maintain a strategic presence in the Gulf of Thailand
and have a firmly committed ally in the ranks of ASEAN.
Most
importantly in terms of China’s contemporary global strategy, Cambodia has
proven to be the ideal testing ground for China’s overseas investment vision.
The lessons that it learned by investing $9.17
billion in the nearby state during the period from 1994-2012, begun
during the early days of China’s international rise and carried into the
present, were obviously instrumental in helping it acquire the feel for
managing similar overseas projects.
Altogether,
these experiences would blend together and contribute to forming the global One
Belt One Road vision, with China’s initial investment forays in historically
allied Cambodia undoubtedly playing an influential role.
From the
Cambodian perspective, its leadership has historically looked to China as a
type of ‘big brother’ in helping it hedge against Thailand and Vietnam. The
historical memory of having been an object of rivalry between these two powers,
and in one sense or another, the military basing ground for each of them at
different times, weighs heavily on its decision-making imperatives.
The
collapse of the Khmer Empire brought Cambodia under the Siamese (Thai) fold for
centuries, whereas the country was institutionally closer with Vietnam during
the French imperial period. During the Vietnam War, its territory was
continuously traversed by the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong, and
although the Vietnamese later liberated Cambodia from the genocidal Khmer
Rouge, nationalist elements interpret the subsequent years as an unnecessary
military occupation by an historic rival.
Aside
from the decade-long Peoples Republic of Kampuchea period from 1979-1989
when it hosted Vietnamese troops and was barred from dealing with China,
there’s a clear continuity of pragmatic relations with its ‘big brother’ that
was practiced by Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge, and then Hun Sen.
Nowadays,
other than the political-economic benefits that it reaps from its partnership
with China, Cambodia also gains elevated prestige in ASEAN simply by being so
closely aligned with Beijing, which has thus transformed the country from a
diplomatic backwater to a premier outpost for regional states to engage China’s
interests in the region.
From an
overall perspective, Chinese-Cambodian relations are a win-win for both sides,
and they’re about to be taken to a totally new level of mutual benefit through
the Greater Mekong Region’s “Central
Corridor” project.
To remind
the reader, this is one of the various connective projects in mainland ASEAN,
with this particular route being a branch of the North-South Corridor through
Laos. The Central Corridor branches off from Vientiane and slithers southwards
down the country’s spine towards Cambodia, following the Mekong River along the
way.
This
variation of the ASEAN Silk Road is important in its own right because of the
potential that it has for deepening trade between China and Cambodia via an
optimal unimodal system (solely ground-based as opposed to transshipment from
boat to land), but it lacks the geostrategic capability of providing Beijing
with an alternative route to the Indian Ocean.
The
China-Myanmar Economic Corridor fully avoids the South China Sea headache and
Strait of Malacca bottleneck, while the primary ASEAN Silk Road through
Thailand has the possibility of doing so in the region of southern Thailand.
This
explains why Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand have a higher chance of falling victim
to the US’ anti-Chinese plans (either in co-opting their elite or wreaking
havoc) than Cambodia does, although Phnom Penh’s chummy ties with Beijing
unquestionably puts it on the target list as well, albeit in a relatively
lesser prioritization.
Transnational
Ethnic Trouble
The Khmer
ethnic majority in Cambodia are a very proud people, infused with the
civilizational glory of the ancient Khmer Empire.
Accordingly,
they’re also very patriotic, and their manifestations of pride could sometimes
translate into nationalist demonstrations that put Thailand and Vietnam in an
uncomfortable position.
The
reason that Cambodia’s neighbors feel uneasy at the exercise of Khmer
patriotism is because they have their own Khmer minority within their borders,
a legacy that nationalists have tried to exploit by attributing it to
colonialism.
In the
case of the Thailand, these are the Northern
Khmer that inhabit the northeastern region of Isan and live close to the Cambodian border. They constitute
around a quarter of the population in Buriram, Sisaket, and Surin provinces.
There are
also scattered segments of the Western Khmer living in Chanthaburi and Trat
provinces, although they have less of an impactful contemporary presence than
in Isan.
All told,
it’s estimated that there are a little over one million Khmer living in
Thailand. The situation with the Khmer Krom in southern Vietnam was already
discussed in the earlier section about that country’s Hybrid War
vulnerabilities, but to revisit the details for a moment, there are also about
one million Khmer living there as well.
The
geographically contiguous presence of ethnic Khmer diaspora living in the Thai
and Vietnamese border regions means that a nationalist-driven Cambodia could
pose a serious threat to the region’s stability. At the moment, it’s extraordinarily
unlikely that Hun Sen would ever proceed down this destabilizing path, but in
the event that he’s overthrown by a Pravy Sektor-like band of
ultra-nationalists, it’s foreseeable that this demographic variable could
become a complication in Cambodia’s bilateral relations with each of these
states.
If
history is an indication, then a future nationalism-obsessed government might
follow in the Khmer Rouge’s footsteps and stage aggressive border provocations
against Vietnam, possibly to the point of tempting Hanoi to launch a
retaliatory strike to snub out the threat just as it did back in 1979. Drawing
a parallel to the present, this might turn out to be a Southeast Asian
variation of the “Reverse
Brzezinski” stratagem, with the entire provocation predicated on the intent
of dragging Vietnam into a quagmire (in this scenario, possibly as punishment
for bettering relations with China).
Using
these strategic principles, the same concept can actually more realistically be
applied towards Thailand in the Khmer-populated areas of its already distressed Isan region.
Bangkok
has been rapidly warming up to Beijing since the 2014 military coup and is now
an integral transit state for the ASEAN Silk Road, thus meaning that any future
Khmer-nationalist government in Cambodia would most likely be directed or
implicitly guided by the US to targeted Thailand before Vietnam.
The only
thing that needs to happen to turn this Hybrid War projection into an actual
plan is for an ultra-nationalist opposition movement to seize power in Phnom
Penh just as they did in Kiev two years ago, most likely following a similar
template of urban terrorism as their pro-American predecessors on the other
side of Eurasia. In fact, such a possibility is actually being actively
prepared for, the specifics of which will be explored more in-depth when the
research discusses the internal political situation in Cambodia.
Border
Rumblings
Aside
from the asymmetrical destabilization that a hyper-nationalist Cambodian
government could bring to its Thai and Vietnamese neighbors, there are also
more conventional dangers that would go with this type of American-imposed
government as well. As the reader likely realized by this point, Cambodia
hasn’t always had positive relations with its two largest neighbors, and these
have also manifested themselves into border disputes, the most recent and acute
of which is the one with Thailand.
The two
countries almost went to war in 2008 over a disputed patch of land right near
the Preah Vihear Temple in northern Cambodia. The reasons for the disagreement
extend well past the physical territory in question and broach the larger
historical and cultural issues, but the immediate root of the problem was the
use of differing imperial-era border maps to support either case.
The
problem was eventually settled in Cambodia’s favor by the International Court
of Justice in 2011, but because of the broader historical-cultural
disagreements at play and the potential for a Khmer-nationalist Cambodian
government to aggravate the situation with Northern Khmers, there’s a plausible
chance that Phnom Penh might render irredentist claims against Thailand one
day.
Adding a
branch to this scenario, the US might extend some form of outward or implicit
diplomatic support for this initiative in order to pressure the Bangkok
authorities and incite grassroots reactionary violence against the Northern
Khmer in Isan.
The
border situation with Vietnam hasn’t been as dramatic as the one with Thailand
since the time of the Khmer Rouge, and currently there aren’t any feasible scenarios
that it could apply against its eastern neighbor. The Khmer Krom are vastly
outnumbered in southern Thailand when compared to the majority ethnic Viet,
unlike the situation in the underpopulated provinces of Isan where they form a
critical mass concentrated nearby the border.
The
prospective problem, then, isn’t so much ethnic irredentism (which is logically
impossible to pull off against Vietnam), but a militant dispute over
their recently delineated border.
Historic
flukes and random kinks along their frontier had long marred bilateral
relations after the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, and even now, the border
demarcation issue been exploited by the nationalist opposition in the latter in
an attempt to score political points. Sam Rainsy, head of the Cambodian
National Rescue Party (CNPR) and the country’s main opposition leader,criticized Hun Sen for allegedly ceding land to
Vietnam.
His
politically ally, Senator Hong Sok Hour, was arrested in August 2015 for presenting a forged
government document that purportedly ‘proved’ Rainsy’s accusation, and the
opposition leader himself was later issued his own arrest warrant in early January 2016 for involvement
in the case.
By that
time he had already fled to France to avoid doing jail time for an unrelated
defamation offense, but the fact that this issue has continued to bubble
indicates that Rainsy may militantly act on his supposed claims if he ever
succeeds in violently seizing power.
King
Of The Cambodian Political Jungle:
The
mentioning of Sam Rainsy is a perfect time to transition the research into
discussing the internal political setup in the country. In a sense, it can read
as a lead-up to what most likely will be a forthcoming Color Revolution attempt
sometime between now and the July 2018 general elections. There are only two
main players – Prime Minister Hun Sen and opposition leader Sam Rainsy – but
only one can be king of the Cambodian political jungle.
Hun
Sen
Cambodia’s
prevailing leader has been in some capacity or another of the premiership since
1985, making him one of the world’s longest-serving heads of state. He was
briefly a member of the Khmer Rouge before defecting to Vietnam, after which he
reentered his homeland following its liberation by the Vietnamese military.
He became
Prime Minister in 1985 and served under the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary
Party, which later rebranded itself as the Cambodian People’s Party in 1991 and
continues to hold power to this day. Hun Sen was almost booted from the
government after losing the disputed 1993 elections, but after protesting the result
and threatening that he’d lead the eastern part of Cambodia to secession, an
agreement was reached whereby he’d serve in the position of co-Prime Minister.
His
counterpart Norodom Ranariddh attempted to clandestinely seize power in 1997
through the use of covertly infiltrated Khmer Rouge and mercenary units to the
capital, but Hun Sen was able to preempt the coup and stage his own
countermoves that removed his rival from power and solidified his sole
leadership.
The next
and last threat to his premiership came during the aftermath of the 2013
elections, whereby Sam Rainsy and his newly formed Cambodian National Rescue
Party clinched 44.46% of the vote compared to Hun Sen and the Cambodian
People’s Party’s 48.83%, which prompted Rainsy to accuse the authorities of
fraud.
The
resultant protests descended into riotous behavior and closely resembled a
Color Revolution attempt at times, but the drama was officially resolved when
both parties agreed to a parliamentary power-sharing proposal on 22 July, 2014.
Still, the close election results and the regime change behavior that was
exhibited for a prolonged period afterwards indicates that a repeat of such
events is very likely to happen in 2018, if not beforehand.
Looked at
more broadly in an international perspective, Hun Sen is an adept pragmatic,
skillfully able to maneuver his country between its two historical rivals and
still retain the dominant political position within his country. Although he
began his career as being ardently pro-Vietnamese during his premiership of the
People’s Republic of Kampuchea, he moderated his approach the moment that his
nominal ally’s military forces departed from his country.
While
never taking any anti-Vietnamese moves, he then swiftly sought to replace his
former patron’s role with that of China, as has been the historic
post-independence tradition of most Cambodian leaders. This decision was made
on geopolitical grounds in hedging against both Vietnam and Thailand, although
not doing so in an aggressive security dilemma-like manner that would
jeopardize profitable relations with each.
Consequently,
he was able to retain his country’s friendship with Vietnam while making
positive inroads with Thailand, and his partnership with China allowed Cambodia
to secure its strategic independence and safeguard its decision-making
sovereignty in what otherwise could have been a complicated geopolitical
situation (especially after having just emerged from a ravenous US-supported
civil war).
Sam
Rainsy
Cambodia’s
main opposition leader is the son of Sam Sary, one of the organizers of the Dap
Chhuon Plot. Also known as the Bangkok Plot, this failed 1959 coup attempt
sought to remove Sihanouk from power and is suspected of having been assisted by the CIA.
Rainsy
moved to France in 1965 and remained there for 27 years until 1992, after which
he returned to his homeland and became a member of parliament. Since then, he
has consistently remained involved in politics and founded the Khmer Nation
Party in 1995, before changing its name to the Sam Rainsy Party in 1998.
It’s
interesting to note that he initially chose nationalistic name for his
organization, which corresponds to the thesis that his opposition movement
seeks to capitalize on such sentiment and may plan to take it to a
destabilization international extent against Thailand and/or Vietnam if he ever
attains full power.
Rainsy’s
own actions attest to his nationalist bent, since he was arrested in 2009 for
encouraging villagers to destroy border markets along the Vietnamese frontier,
for which he was found
guilty in-absentia for inciting racial discrimination and
intentionally damaging property.
He was
pardoned by the King in July 2013 and returned that month to run in the general elections
under the newly formed Cambodian National Rescue Party, a merger organization
composed of his namesake party and the “Human Rights Party”. He eventually lost
the vote and used his defeat as a rallying cry for organizing a Color
Revolution attempt to seize power, which as was mentioned, ended up diffused
after a parliamentary power-sharing proposal was agreed to.
True to
his nationalist ‘credentials’, he continued to agitate that Hun Sen was
apparently ‘ceding’ land to Vietnam, and he worked hand-in-hand with his
political ally Senator Hong Sok Hour in having the latter produce a forged
government document ‘proving’ this outrageous charge.
His
sidekick was soon arrested, and when Rainsy’s own parliamentary immunity was
stripped from him and a warrant issued for his arrest during a visit to
‘supporters’ tin South Korea, he opted to evade the courts and currently remains abroad.
Days
before, he had gone on social media to intimate that Suu Kyi’s electoral victory forebodes
well for what he believes will be his own forthcoming one in Cambodia,
seemingly confirming that he too might also have been groomed by the CIA for
future leadership.
Overall,
in assessing Sam’s political strategy, it’s evident that he has repeatedly gone
out of his way to emphasize Khmer nationalism, which for the reasons described
in the previous section, could end up being very destabilizing for the region
if he ever succeeds in seizing power.
Constructing
Cambodia’s Next Regime Change Scenario:
Rainsy
The Rascal
Wrapping
up the research on Cambodia, it’s now time to finally address the most likely
scenario in which Hun Sen’s government could be overthrown. Sam Rainsy, like
has been earlier described, is a clear nationalist and has sought to fuse his
aggressive ideological rhetoric and provocations with Color Revolution tactics.
His
near-victory in the 2013 elections demonstrates that there’s a sizeable
proportion of the population that agrees with him, although not quite enough to
democratically legitimize his leadership aspirations.
Rainsy
will face arrest due to his two outstanding warrants (one for defamation and
the other for his involvement in Senator Hour’s forged government documents
case) if he returns to Cambodia, and Hun Sen has recently said that he’d “cut off [his] right hand” before he
allows his rival to be pardoned again.
In all
probability, he’s likely to do whatever it takes to make sure that Rainsy
doesn’t come back to Cambodia before the July 2018 elections, seeing as how he
so bluntly put his entire reputation on the line through his dramatic threat.
Thematic
Backdrop
What will
probably happen then is that Rainsy will become a type of political symbol
either through his ‘self-imposed exile’ (as he styles it) or the ‘political
martyrdom’ that would result in his return to Cambodia.
If he
chooses the latter, it might be a lot easier to stir the Color Revolution pot
and paint him as following in the footsteps of Tymoshenko or Suu Kyi, two of
his regime change predecessors whose imprisonment catapulted them to global
(Western) media stardom.
No matter
how it occurs, it’s certain that the Color Revolution movement will aim to
socially precondition both the Cambodian masses and the foreign media into
viewing the upcoming vote as a battle between a pro-Chinese (and possibly even
falsely slandered as a pro-Vietnamese) “dictator” and a pro-Western “democrat”,
bringing the tiny Southeast Asian state into the forefront of global attention.
By that
time, the Color Revolution infrastructure would be in place and the opposition
can then commence their regime change operation, knowingly taking it as far as
urban terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, thus representing the latest Hybrid
War battleground.
Tactical
Considerations
Be that
as it may, the scenario can actually be fast-forwarded and deployed before the
elections. Like with the newer Color Revolution templates that have been
experimented with across the world, a concrete “event” such as a ‘disputed
election’ or some other conventional rallying cry need not actually happen in
order to spark the premeditated insurgency.
What’s
most important is that the necessary social infrastructure be capable of
gathering large crowds of ‘human shields’ (civilian protesters) in order to
protect a small core of violent provocateurs and engineer what can later
manipulatively be made to appear as a “bloody government crackdown” against
“peaceful protesters”.
While
nationalism is visibly a strong unifying force in Cambodian society, patriotism
is equally as strong, and even though these two could clash (manifested by
anti-government and pro-government demonstrators, respectively), the patriots
might neutralize the disruptive “nationalists” and spoil their plans for a
larger uprising. Along the same lines of thinking, a minor border spat in one
of the frontier villages might not be enough to motivate people in the capital
to come out to the streets in protest, especially since they have to worry
about their own mouths to feed in ASEAN’s poorest state.
Labor
Unions’ Unifying Role
That last
point is actually the most important, and it’s precisely the one that’s capable
of bringing large segments of the population out to protest against the
government.
Unlike in
Vietnam, labor unions are already legalized in Cambodia and have played an
active role in the country’s post-civil war history. The threat of labor
disturbances has become increasingly common in the past few years, and garment
workers recently prevailed in pressuring the government to once more raise
their minimum wage in October 2015, this time to $140 a month from the previous $128 that they succeeded in gaining the year prior.
To put
this into context, the minimum wage had earlier been $80 a month in 2012,
before being raised to $100 a month for 2014 prior to the aforementioned
increases, all of which were the result of threatening labor strikes and
engaging in selective clashes with police.
Just like
the author argued in the preceding analysis for Vietnam, there’s nothing at all
inherently wrong with an organized labor movement that agitates for worker’s
rights, but the danger presents itself when these organizations are exploited
by politically minded actors working for regime change ends.
Unleashing
The Dogs Of Hybrid War
In the
prospectively forthcoming scenario for Cambodia, labor rights activists take
center stage in leading a renewed anti-government movement, perhaps even before
the July 2018 elections. They may either do so independently as part of their
strategy to continuously raise the minimum wage, or they might craft a
provocation in order to prompt a “government crackdown” against the “peaceful
protesters”.
Additionally,
if Hun Sen accepts Washington’s offer to join the TPP but then gets cold
feet like Yanukovich did with the EU Association Agreement, then that event in
and of itself might be the spark needed to ‘justify’ the preplanned
anti-government movement.
No matter
which route is finally decided upon, the end result is that the labor movement,
particularly one which involves the country’s 700,000 garment factory workers
(responsible for $5.8 billion in exports for 2014), takes the leading
role in opposing the authorities.
This
critical mass of individuals could then enact or threat to enact a paralyzing
strike that would cripple the country’s economy and immediately cast it as an
unpredictable and unstable place to do business in.
The
nationalist appeal of this campaign would be maximized if it’s coordinated in
such a way as to target Vietnamese business, which account for $3.46 billion worth of projects in Cambodia and are
the country’s sixth largest investor.
Expectedly,
the ‘labor protesters’ will link up with the Cambodian National Rescue Party to
create a unified front against Hun Sen, and the combined sum of their efforts
might realistically be enough to topple the government.
The only
alternative in such a case would be large-scale state-inflicted violence, which
even if it’s done in the interests of self-defense and the preservation of
overall peace and harmony, could be damage the authorities’ legitimacy to the
point of unwittingly engendering even more anti-government sentiment.
Worse
still, Western countries could pull out their investments and cooperate with
ASEAN in sanctioning Phnom Penh. In this dire scenario, Hun Sen hangs on to
power by a thread and the consequent economic warfare that’s launched against
the country is impactful enough to lead to his government’s dissolution within
the next few years.
To be
continued…
Andrew Korybko is the American political
commentator currently working for the Sputnik agency. He is the post-graduate of the MGIMO
University and author of the monograph “Hybrid Wars: The Indirect Adaptive Approach To Regime Change”
(2015). This text will be included into his forthcoming book on the theory
of Hybrid Warfare.
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