WE
EXPECTED the advice to President Rodrigo Duterte of his four predecessors to
“proceed with caution” in dealing with China on territorial issues that had
been decided in favor of the Philippines by the Permanent Court of Arbitration
in The Hague.
The
counsel given by former Presidents Ramos, Estrada, Arroyo and Aquino during the
National Security Council meeting last Wednesday actually suggested itself,
because it appears to be the only sane and safe approach to improving relations
with China under the circumstances.
It would
be disastrous for President Duterte’s special envoy, passing through either the
front door or the back channel, to march to Beijing waving the PCA ruling assailing
China’s “nine-dash line” unilateral acquisition of territory as a violation of
international law.
The
President’s emissary to Beijing must not present an agenda topped by the PCA,
as hotheads would have it. Malacañang should follow its disposition to have
direct dialogue, instead of the multilateral approach suggested by the White
House.
The Hague
award (ruling), for which Mr. Duterte has thanked his predecessor Mr. Aquino,
is an ace that could be played at the proper time later in the game.
At the
moment, the first order of business is to start neighborly conversations with
focus on how to repair relations and search for ways to enhance
people-to-people dealings. The more contentious topics can wait for favorable
weather.
Manila’s
opening the dialogue by citing the PCA ruling would raise the non-negotiable
question of sovereignty and could immediately torpedo the talks.
ASEAN statement silent on PCA ruling
FORMER
Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario and former ambassador to the US Jose
Cuisia Jr. had criticized Foreign Secretary Perfecto Yasay’s not insisting that
the PCA ruling be mentioned in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
closing statement in its recent meeting in Laos.
But the
already explosive regional situation would have heated up had the Philippines
insisted on it. Such move could even lead to the breakup of ASEAN, some of
whose 10 members are in China’s sphere of influence.
Despite
its holding the PCA ace, the Philippines is proceeding with caution, preferring
to wait and move according to the universally accepted pacific modes of
settling disputes.
President
Duterte has already said that war is not an option. If only because of the wide
disparity in Chinese and Philippine military might (shown in the
Globalfirepower.com data cited below), moving in a confrontational way may not
be a good maneuver.
Mr.
Duterte has chosen former President Fidel V. Ramos to open exploratory talks
with Beijing. The EDSA hero, whose age 88 happens to be a Chinese lucky number,
got an early introduction to China studies from his father Narciso, a long-time
ambassador to the Republic of China and later foreign secretary.
It is
hoped that sooner or later the more substantial issues, including the safety
and livelihood of Filipinos fishing at Panatag (Scarborough) shoal, would be
taken up in earnest by the two neighbors in good faith.
But Del
Rosario is pessimistic: “My experience before was, a bilateral meeting with
China is not very productive. China will stick by the position that they have
indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea.”
Philippines no military match to China
COMPARING
the military might of the Philippines (No. 51 among 126 nations surveyed) and
China (No. 3), one might understand why President Duterte prefers to talk
rather than confront China on the PAC ruling.
Below are
data taken from the Globalfirepower.com website comparing the firepower of 126
nations. We placed side by side the figures for the Philippines and China, with
those of the United States (No. 1) referenced in parenthesis:
Population:
Phl 101M; Chn 1.4B; (US 321.3M).
Manpower
available: Phl 50.7M; Chn 750M; (US 145M).
Fit for
service: Phl 41.575M; Chn 619M; (US 120M).
Active
military men: Phl 220,000; Chn 2.335M; (US 1.4M).
Active
reserves: Phl 430,000; Chn 2.3M; (US 1.1M).
Aircraft
(all types): Phl 135; Chn 2,942; (US 13,444).
Helicopters:
Phl 91; Chn 802; (US 6,084).
Attack
helicopters: Phl 0; Chn 200; (US 957).
Attack
aircraft (Fixed-wing): Phl 8; Chn 1,385; (US 2,785).
Fighter
aircraft: Phl 0; Chn 1,230; (US 2,308).
Transport
aircraft: Phl 74; Chn 782; (US 5,739).
Serviceable
airports: Phl 247; Chn 507; (US 13,513).
Tank
strength: Phl 45; Chn 9,150; (US 8,848).
AFV*
strength: Phl 778; Chn 4,788; (US 41,062).
SPG*
strength: Phl 0; Chn 1,710; (US 1,934).
Towed
artillery: Phl 270; Chn 6,246; (US 1,299).
MLRS*
strength: Phl 0; Chn 1,770; (US 1,331).
Major
ports/terminal: Phl 6; Chn 15; (US 24).
Fleet
strength: Phl 119; Chn 714; (US 415).
Aircraft
carriers: Phl 0; Chn 1; (US 19).
Submarines:
Phl 0; Chn 68; (US 75).
Frigates:
Phl 3; Chn 48; (US 6).
Destroyers:
Phl 0; Chn 32; (US 62).
Corvettes:
Phl 11; Chn 26; (US 0).
Patrol
craft: Phl 38; Chn 138; (US 13).
External
debt: Phl $77,670M; Chn $949,600M; (US $17.260T).
Defense
budget: Phl $3,000M; Chn $155,600M; (US $581T)
Oil
production (bbl): Phl 21,000; Chn 4.189M; (US 8.653M).
Coastline
(km): Phl 36,289; Chn 14,500; (US 19,924).
Land area
(sq km): Phl 300,000; Chn 9,596,961; (US 9,826,675).
(*AFV=
armored fighting vehicle; *SPG= self-propelled gun (artillery piece); *MLRS=
multiple rocket system; *MBT= main battle tank)
Globalfirepower.com
sources: CIA.gov. CIA World Factbook, Wikipedia.com, public domain print and
media sources and user contributions. Some values may be estimates when
official sources are lacking.
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