There is a strong case for the regional
grouping to issue a separate statement after the verdict.
On July
12, The Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) will finally issue a
much-anticipated verdict on the Philippines' South China Sea case against
China. Once the verdict is issued, the world will be looking to see how various
actors react, including Asean, of which Manila is a member.
In this
context, eyes will be on whether Asean as a bloc chooses and is able to adopt a
separate joint statement in response to the PCA ruling.
This
would be in addition to the range of other expected responses by the grouping
and its members, be it including the general language in a few paragraphs of
its joint communique at the upcoming Asean Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in late
July or leaving individual countries to issue their own statements as they see
fit.
Though
each of these other responses has its merits as well, there is a strong case to
be made for Asean to issue a separate joint statement as a regional grouping in
response to the PCA ruling.
Before
stating the case for a separate statement, it is important to clarify what is
meant and not meant by it. Contrary to what some might suggest, by calling for
a separate statement following the PCA verdict, no one with any knowledge of
Asean reasonably expects the regional grouping to side with a particular
country or even back the outcome of the case in that statement. Rather, the
focus of that statement should ideally be on how Asean welcomes any attempt by
anyone (including the Philippines) to pursue the peaceful, lawful resolution of
disputes and reiterates the need for everyone (including China) to respect
legal and diplomatic processes without resorting to force.
Issuing
such a statement is clearly in the interest of the regional grouping. First and
most obviously, even though only four Asean states are claimants in the South
China Sea disputes, all 10 of them have an interest in seeing these disputes
resolved peacefully and lawfully rather than through the use of force, and
ensuring that basic principles like the freedom of navigation and overflight
are protected. The South China Sea is the lifeblood of the region, with more
than US$5 trillion (S$6.8 trillion) worth of international shipping trade
passing through it annually.
More
broadly, the rules-based regional and international order, which includes the
PCA, is the only thing that protects the rights and privileges of all states
large and small - from China to Laos - and provides the peaceful, stable
foundation for economic growth to occur. Indeed, the notion that certain states
may conclude that their strong economic ties with China prevent them from
supporting such a statement is rather ironic, since they would be failing to
defend the very principles that allow their economic growth and the choices
therein to occur in the first place.
Second,
Asean as a grouping has an interest in demonstrating its unity in the face of
this rather divisive issue. The past few years have witnessed Asean's growing
maturity, acknowledged by its rising role in the shaping of the regional
architecture as well as the intensifying involvement of major powers in the
sub-region. But these trends have also made the liabilities of Asean's
institutional features more visible and threatened the grouping's much prized
centrality, presenting what former Asean secretary-general Surin Pitsuwan has
called an "existential challenge".
Nowhere
is this more evident than on the South China Sea issue, where pressure by
external powers has exacerbated Asean divisions and led to statements not being
issued, be it in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in 2012 or more recently at the foreign
ministers' meeting in Yuxi, China, last month.
The
adoption of a joint statement would be a powerful demonstration of Asean's
ability to confront the South China Sea issue during this moment of
international scrutiny. It would send a clear message that Asean is able to
tackle even the most vexing regional and global challenges and further cement
its position as the fulcrum of Asia's architecture.
This is
especially the case given the triple challenges the grouping faces on that
front this year: contending with the PCA ruling; managing Asean-China relations
during the 25th anniversary of the dialogue partnership; and being led by this
year's chair Laos, a landlocked country that has little interest in the South
China Sea and a lot invested in its relationship with Beijing.
While
issuing a separate statement on the upcoming PCA decision would be a
significant move in line with Asean's interests, it would also be far from
unprecedented. In fact, one of the strongest arguments in favour of such a
statement is that there is precedent both for the issuance of such statements
in general as well as the specific language that might be used in this
particular case.
On the
former, Asean has already been issuing statements on matters of regional and
global importance over the years apart from its usual joint communiques.
Following
North Korea's missile testing on Jan 6, Asean foreign ministers issued a short
two-paragraph statement on Jan 8 reiterating the importance of peace and
security on the Korean peninsula as well as their support for denuclearisation.
On the
South China Sea, in May 2014, Asean foreign ministers issued a brief statement
expressing "serious concerns" over ongoing developments in the South
China Sea. This was done under the chairmanship of Myanmar, a country that,
like Laos, has little interest in the issue as well.
With
respect to the specific language that might be in such a separate statement,
Asean has already been adopting statements that contain the kind of wording
that might comprise it. At the US-Asean Sunnylands Summit back in February, the
joint statement agreed by all 10 Asean states did not just refer to general
principles related to the South China Sea but the importance of "full
respect for legal and diplomatic processes without resorting to the threat or
use of force", a clear reference to the need for both China and the
Philippines to abide by the PCA verdict. The Asean media statement that was
initially agreed on by all 10 South-east Asian countries last month also
contained similar language.
Even
though it is clear that adopting a separate statement would be in Asean's
interests and would be far from unprecedented, the regional grouping may well
choose not to adopt a separate statement for any number of reasons. If so, it
should at least ensure that the language in its next expected joint communique
- after the 49th Asean Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Vientiane in late July -
does not walk back on what Asean has been referencing in its statements so far
this year. Beyond the content of these statements, preparations also need to be
made by South-east Asian states to ensure that consensus does not break down at
the last minute. Asean simply cannot afford another Phnom Penh under Laos'
chairmanship.
Prashanth
Parameswaran
Prashanth Parameswaran is associate editor of
The Diplomat magazine based in Washington, DC and a doctoral candidate at the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University researching on
South-east Asia, Asian security issues and US foreign policy in the
Asia-Pacific.
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